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Abstract
This Article addresses mutual assistance between the United States and Colombia and the is-
sues surrounding the drug war. Part I examines past and present cooperative agreements, the goals
of the agreements in the context of national and regional security, and the reasons the agreements
have or have not succeeded. Part II discusses current U.S. aid policy toward Colombia and the
problems the United States will face if assistance proceeds as planned. Part III presents a critical
view of Colombia as a nation unable to deal successfully with its many political, social, and moral
crises, and incapable of living up to its cooperative responsibilities. This Article concludes with a
summary of the issues and what, if anything, can be done to save Colombia from itself.
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INTRODUCTION
The issue of mutual assistance between the United States
and Colombia to prosecute drug traffickers in the long-standing
drug war raises significant controversy and concern over U.S. in-
volvement in another country's internal matters. Despite waging
a bloody and costly campaign during the last decade to bring a
handful of major drug cartels operating in Colombia to justice,
there are now hundreds of "mini-cartels"' and guerrilla and
paramilitary forces involved in the narcotics business.' Colom-
bia is awash in lawlessness and corruption, and the government's
attempts to maintain control have proved about as successful as a
blind person trying to hit a pifiata.
This Article addresses mutual assistance between the United
States and Colombia and the issues surrounding the drug war.
Part I examines past and present cooperative agreements, the
goals of the agreements in the context of national and regional
security, and the reasons the agreements have or have not suc-
ceeded. Part II discusses current U.S. aid policy toward Colom-
bia and the problems the United States will face if assistance pro-
ceeds as planned. Part III presents a critical view of Colombia as
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sidad Pontificia Bolivariana;J.D., College of William and Mary; LL.M. and MA., Univer-
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his insightful comments and encouragement and also gratefully acknowledges the con-
tributions of Research Assistants Victoria Avalon and Michael Morelli.
1. See Drug Enforcement Administration, Traffickers from Colombia (visited Apr. 4,
2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/traffickers/colombia.htm> (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal); Drug Control Narcotics Threat from Colombia Continues To Crow,
GAO/NSIAD-99-136, at 4 [hereinafter Drug Control].
2. See generally, CARLOS MEDINA GALLEGO, AUTODEFENSAS, PARAMIL1TARES Y NARCO-
TRAFCO EN COLOMBIA (1990); El enemigo interno, SEMANA (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://
216.35.197.109/SearchDir2/917/actualidad/zzzpnqnuklc.asp> (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal).
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a nation unable to deal successfully with its many political, social,
and moral crises, and incapable of living up to its cooperative
responsibilities. This Article concludes with a summary of the
issues and what, if anything, can be done to save Colombia from
itself.
I. MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
The justification for U.S. involvement in Colombia springs
from the simple truth that narcotics trafficking into the United
States from supplier nations in Latin America represents a na-
tional security threat as serious as any the United States has
faced in its history.' While the so-called war on drugs began dur-
ing the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, placing
counternarcotics on the national security agenda was plainly ar-
ticulated by President George Bush, who declared in his inaugu-
ral address:
There are few clear areas in which we as a society must rise up
united and express our intolerance. And the most obvious
now is drugs. And when that first cocaine was smuggled in on
a ship, it may as well have been a deadly bacteria, so much has
it hurt the body, the soul of our country. And there is much
to be done and to be said, but take my word for it: This
scourge will stop.4
President Bush's resolve to end the scourge, however, did little
to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, and Co-
lombia declined to extradite drug lords to face trial in the
United States.5 Presently eighty percent of the world's cocaine,
and a rapidly escalating amount of high-grade heroin, continue
3. See RI.P. Abeyratne, International Initiatives at Controlling the Illicit Transportation
of Narcotic Drugs by Air, 63 J. AIR L. & CoM. 289, 302 (1997) (explaining that world's
leading supplier of processed cocaine is Colombia); Stephen Y. Otera, International Ex-
tradition and the Medellin Cocaine Cartel: Surgical Removal of Colombian Cocaine Traffickers
for Trial in the United States, 13 Loy. L. A. INTr'L & Comp. L.J. 955, 957 (1991) (stating
that United States is principal market for cocaine, and almost all cocaine is exported
from Colombia); Mary Ellen Welch, The Extraterritorial War on Cocaine: Perspectives from
Bolivia and Colombia, 12 SuFFoLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 39, 60 (1988) (noting extent of Co-
lombia's domination of cocaine processing and distribution).
4. Text of President Bush's Inaugural Address, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 99,
101 (Jan. 20, 1989).
5. SeeJoshua Warmund, Comment, Removing Drug Lords and Street Pushers: The Ex-
tradition of Nationals in Colombia and the Dominican Republic, 22 FoRDHAm INT'L LJ. 2373,
2384-88 (1999) (describing how narco-terrorism operated to prevent extradition).
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flooding into the United States. 6 Coupled with fifty years of
guerrilla insurgency and plagued by the usual problems af-
flicting developing nations, Colombia has arrived at a point of
near disintegration into anarchy and chaos.7
President Bill Clinton's administration's international coun-
ternarcotics efforts in Colombia have fared little better, and Re-
publican lawmakers have criticized the White House for mostly
talk and little action. At one point in 1998, following a plea for
help by White House drug czar General Barry McCaffrey, the
U.S. Congress released US$290 million in emergency funding
for Colombia. Yet nearly two years later, according to one Re-
publican insider, "[n] ot one piece of equipment from that fund-
ing has arrived in Colombia yet. The general is not credible with
this strategy; it is pie in the sky. Why should we trust him or the
administration now after having screamed at them for three
years to mind the store?"8 Clearly, something has gone terribly
wrong in coordinating interdiction, eradication, and criminal
justice efforts. Political corruption and ignorance at the highest
levels of government in both the United States and Colombia,
unprecedented narco-terrorism weakening the political resolve,
and lack of consistency between successive U.S. and Colombian
administrations in fighting the drug war have all conspired
against a successful counternarcotics policy.
But now a sea change is underfoot on both sides of the Gulf
of Mexico. Colombia is on the precipice of total collapse and
the United States is planning a massive assistance package to pre-
vent Colombia's disintegration. In exchange, U.S. aid is predi-
cated on Colombia's demonstrated commitment and coopera-
tion with U.S. goals in the region, including peace and stability.
Many analysts, however, question Colombia's capability and re-
6. See General Barry McCaffrey, U.S. Counterdrug Assistance for Colombia and the An-
dean Region (last modified Feb. 22, 2000) <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
news/testimony/022200/index.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal) ("Colombian coca cultivation has doubled in three years from 50,000 hectares
[123,500 acres] in 1995 to 100,000 [247,000] in 1998.").
7. See generally JENNY PEARcE, COLOMBIA: INSIDE THE LABYRINTH (1990) (containing
detailed analysis of Colombia's modem history).
8. Jaime Dettmer, Colombia Implodes, INSIGHT MAG., Sept. 13, 1999, at 9. In re-
sponse, a White House insider stated that the Republicans "fail to appreciate what Mc-
Caffrey is trying to do and that he isn't a water-carrier for the White House. He stakes
out a position and then he defends it-and that is what he's doing now. He is an
apolitical appointment by law and electioneering doesn't enter into his thinking." Id.
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solve to meet the expectations of its northern neighbor.9
The growth of narcotics trafficking from Colombia to the
United States and the development of different schemes to laun-
der drug money are evidence of the international dimension of
criminal activity. These activities are difficult to detect and even
more difficult to prove. International organized crime is facili-
tated by the expansion of international trade, the increase of in-
ternational travel, and the advance in communications. The
traffickers and producers of illegal drugs move with great facility
across borders. More practical, however, is the capability to di-
rect the movements of their enterprise from home.' ° Traffickers
"make decisions quickly, are highly flexible in making necessary
changes, emphasize reduction of business risks and have good
instincts for selecting associates, subordinates, and experts.""
Further complicating this complex enterprise, narcotraffick-
ing is supported by legitimate industries such as telecommunica-
tions, computers, and chemical producers. Other firms emerge
to meet the narcotrafficker's needs such as financial services
firms ready and willing "to assist in money movements and
container builders to construct exclusively for traffickers."' 2 In
order to market their product, the Colombian groups operate
through cells or branches in the United States and other coun-
tries. These organizations contract and subcontract with many
people who specialize in various tasks. The various tasks include
obtaining base from source countries, processing base, trans-
porting the product to market, laundering money from the
sales, providing the connections with the local officials and po-
lice, and offering security to protect the drug lords.'" Extensive
cooperation is necessary for the United States and Colombia to
bring these individuals to justice. Often evidence, accounting
9. Paul Wolf, United States and Colombia, Z MAc., Mar. 1999; Center for Interna-
tional Policy, Peace Process in Colombia (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.ciponline.org/
colombia/> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
10. See 3 SIDNEYJAY ZABLUDOFF, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 2, 20-49 (1997)
(examining Colombian narcotics organization as business enterprise and explaining
how Colombian criminal groups apply their organizational skills to expand fast and
efficiently). According to Zabludoff, these organizations have a "strong entrepreneurial
bent." Id. These criminals developed distribution techniques and sophisticated global
enterprises by organizing numerous players from different industries. Id.
11. Id. at 28.
12. Id. at 25.
13. Id.
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records, currency, guns, drugs, and testimonies of key witnesses
may only be found in one country. Unfortunately, politics, poli-
cies, and different legal systems offer barriers in curtailing safe
heavens for criminals.
As the leading narcotics supplier, Colombia has been in the
eye of the hurricane for more than thirty years."4 The hunger of
the U.S. population for narcotics and the willingness of the drug
cartels to succor that appetite resulted in an expansion of crimi-
nal activity affecting both countries.1" By the end of the 1970s,
the two countries began building on bilateral and international
mutual assistance agreements already in place to coordinate the
coming fight against international drug trafficking. While many
of the agreements have failed to be enforced or ratified, Colom-
bia and the United States have reached a number of important
agreements for mutual assistance in criminal matters.
Mutual assistance assumes that two or more countries can
overcome constraints of international law for conducting extra-
territorial law enforcement activities through various quid pro
quo mechanisms. 16
Cooperation and mutual assistance mechanisms are intended
to compensate for the problems that can accompany the re-
pression of an offense with foreign elements. In criminal
matters for example, a state wishing to exercise its jurisdiction
will want, depending on the case, to obtain pieces of evidence
located in another state or to ensure the presence of the ac-
cused on its territory.17
Among the terms of the International Narcotics Control Act of
14. In the department of Norte de Santander, territory hotly contested by guerril-
las of the Ejrcito Liberaci6n Nacional ("ELN") and paramilitary groups, more than
100,000 acres of high quality coca is under cultivation. See La Guerra Blanca, REVISTA
SEMiANA, Aug. 30, 1999. Net coca cultivation has increased by 50% since 1996 and pro-
duction is expected to increase by 50%. La Guerra, supra. Colombia has also become
the primary supplier of heroin in the Eastern United States. See Drug Contro4 supra note
1, at 4.
15. See Warmund, supra note 5, at 2375 (citing J.J. Juan R. Torruella, One Judge's
Attempt at a Rational Discussion of the So-Called War on Drugs, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 6
(1996)). By fall of 1996, there were almost 12 million illicit drug users in the United
States. Id.
16. Martin Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 86 AMi.J. INT'L. L. 548, 550 (1992).
17. Pierre Trudel, Jurisdiction over the Internet: A Canadian Perspective, 32 INT'L LAW.
1027, 1047 (1998).
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1989,18 (or "Control Act") for instance, the targeted countries
were urged to coordinate with INTERPOL in creating an inter-
national database on the flow of those types of weapons that are
being acquired illegally by international narcotics traffickers. 9
A. Early Agreements in Criminal Matters Between the United States
and Colombia
The United States has relied on various mutual assistance
treaties and agreements with Latin America going back nearly
sixty years. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
20
(or "Inter-American Treaty") signed in 1947 declared in part,
"[t] hat the obligation of mutual assistance and common defense
of the American Republics is essentially related to their demo-
cratic ideals and to their will to cooperate .... -21 This treaty
further stated:
[t]hat the American regional community affirms as a mani-
fest truth that juridical organization is a necessary prerequi-
site of security and peace, and that peace is found on justice
and moral order and, consequently, on the international rec-
ognition and protection of human rights and freedoms, on
the indispensable well-being of the people, and on the effec-
tiveness of democracy for the international realization ofjus-
tice and security.22
While the intent of the treaty was to pledge mutual assist-
ance in the event of "an armed attack by any State against an
American State,' 23 and to resolve differences between North,
South, and Central American States amicably and under the
terms of Articles 51 and 54 of the Charter of the United Nations,
the treaty opened the door to possible intervention by one
American State in the affairs of another American State if the
peace and the security of the region were threatened.
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sover-
eignty or political independence of any American State
18. International Narcotics Control Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-231, 103 Stat.
1954 (1989).
19. Id. § 12(c).
20. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Rights, T.IAS. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77
(1947).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. art. 3.
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should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed
attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict,
or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the
peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet im-
mediately in order to agree on the measures which must be
taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggres-
sion or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for
the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace
and security of the Continent.24
If the treaty required consultation among signatories, then
the reasonable response would be the mobilization of some type
of multinational force to resolve the conflict. The notion of
multilateral regional enforcement has remained a debatable
component of subsequent mutual cooperation agreements and
treaties. It has taken the form of calls to create a multilateral
strike force or peacekeeping force under the authority of the
Organization of American States.
The spirit of the Inter-American Treaty continued through-
out the early days of the Cold War. In 1960, the U.S. Congress
passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 196125 ("Act"), intended as
[ain Act to promote the foreign policy, security, and general
welfare of the United States by assisting people of the world
in their efforts toward economic development and internal
and external security, and for other purposes.26
The Act extended various types of assistance to friendly coun-
tries, including military assistance 27 and, more significantly, it
laid out the ground rules for U.S. personnel working on foreign
assistance-related programs in the region.28 The Act became an
early road map for technical advisers and consultants-the
point-persons for fighting the Cold War in Latin America. The
24. Id. art. 6.
25. Act for International Development of 1961, 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. (1961).
Some other assistance acts legislated prior to the Act for International Development of
1961 ("Foreign Assistance Act") were the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of
1951, 22 U.S.C. 1611 et seq. (1968), which was eventually superceded by other acts, and
the Mutual Security Act of 1954, 22 U.S.C. 1750 et seq. (1994), which was eventually
repealed.
26. 22 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
27. Id. Part II, chap. 2, § 503 et seq. It is notable that as early as 1961, in § 502,
Congress called for the creation of an international military force under the Organiza-
tion of American States.
28. Id. chap. 2, § 621 et seq.
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Act would form the foundation upon which subsequent legisla-
tion for mutual assistance and mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters would be added.29 For instance,
Section 490 of the Act, as amended by 22 U.S.C. 2291 (j) re-
quires the President to certify by March 1 of each year which
drug producing and shipping countries have fully cooperated
with the United States or took adequate steps to achieve full
compliance during the previous year with the goals estab-
lished by the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.30
Upon failure to meet the statutory objectives, the U.S. President
can decertify or grant a vital national interest certification.
B. Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
International evidence gathering is one of the most crucial
challenges in criminal prosecution. While borders do not pres-
ent an obstacle to criminals, they are a hindrance to prosecutors.
Because sovereignty precludes an official from a specific country
from acting on behalf of a foreign state, obtaining evidence in a
foreign jurisdiction presents a number of problems. Different
legal systems contain distinct formalities and procedures. More-
over, interpreting rules and translations often result in misun-
derstandings and confusion. To overcome such challenges and
be able to investigate and prosecute transnational organized
crime, the United States has entered into Mutual Legal Assist-
ance Treaties in Criminal Matters ("MLAT") with different coun-
tries.'
MLATs allow countries to cooperate in the fight against in-
29. Under the Foreign Assistance Act, each year the U.S. Department of State must
prepare an International Narcotics Control Strategy Report ("INCSR"). This report
supplies the factual source for the presidential narcotics certification determinations
for major drug producing and drug-transit countries. Certification depends partly on
whether a country, during the prior year, fully cooperated with the United States, or
took adequate measures on its own, to achieve full compliance with the goals and objec-
tives established by the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention. Under the law, the report must
state the extent to which the country that has received international narcotics assistance
in the past two fiscal years, has "met the goals and objectives of the United Nations
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances." For
more information, see Bruce Zagaris, U.S. International Cooperation Against Transnational
Organized Crime, 44 WAYNE L. REv. 1401 (1998).
30. See Drug Control, supra note 1, at 4 n.3.
31. As of November 15, 1997, the United States had 23 Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties ("MIAT") in existence. Zagaris, supra note 29.
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ternational crime. With an MLAT in place, judges overseeing
investigations abroad may ask the judicial authorities of the re-
quested country to handle the case on his or her government's
behalf. The requested state will then give mutual assistance by
executing the official acts requested on its territory and forward-
ing the results to the requestor state in a specific criminal case.
Mutual legal assistance encompasses service of summons, the
production and certification ofjudgments and other court docu-
ments, searches and seizure of property, hearing witnesses, and
securing and handing over evidence, documents, objects, and as-
sets. 32 MLATs supplement international law enforcement assist-
ance to enforcement officials.
In particular, their purpose is to serve as a more effective and
efficient substitute for letters rogatory when compulsory pro-
cess is required to obtain evidence, or when specific proce-
dures must be complied with for the evidence to be admissi-
ble at a criminal trial in the requesting country. Whenever
possible, it is most efficient for countries to deal directly at
the police level. In most instances, MILATs specifically pro-
vide that the treaty countries can provide law enforcement
assistance to each other through other channels. 33
Regarding mutual assistance in criminal investigations, the
United States and Colombia have signed various agreements.3 4
The only legal assistance treaty currently in force in the adminis-
tration of justice, however, is the 1976 agreement to cooperate
in the investigation of the activities in Colombia of the Lockheed
32. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, Negotiations on Criminal Law Assistance Treaties, 33 AM.
J. Comp. L. 467 (1985); see also, 2 MAtRIAN NASH (LEICH), CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1981-1988 1449, 1488 (1994); 3 BRUNO A. Ris-
TAU & MICHAEL ABBELL, INTERNATIONALJUDICiAL ASSISTANCE (CRIMINAL) §§ 12-4-1-12-
4-8 (1995).
33. Bruce Zagaris, Avoiding Criminal Liability in the Conduct of International Business,
21 WM. MITCHELL L. Rv. 749, 812-13 (1996).
34. See T.Ia.S. No. 8244, agreement signed at Washington Apr. 22, 1976, entered
into force Apr. 22, 1976; Criminal Investigations, 32 U.S.T. 1920, T.IA.S. No. 9809,
agreement effected by exchange of letters, signed at Washington July 7 and 15, 1980,
entered into force July 15, 1980; Senate Treaty Doc. No. 97-11, Mutual Legal Assistance
treaty on mutual legal assistance, signed Aug. 20, 1980, not in force; Criminal Investiga-
tions, T.I.A.S. No. 9860, agreement effected by exchange of letters, signed Washington,
Aug. 28 and Sept. 10, 1980, entered into force Sept. 10, 1980; Temp. State Dept. No. 92-
77, Mutual Cooperation Agreement to Combat, Prevent and Control Money Launder-
ing Arising From Illicit Activities, signed in San Antonio, Feb. 27, 1992, entered into
force Feb. 27, 1992.
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Aircraft Corporation ("Lockheed Agreement"). s  Otherwise,
the exchange of evidence and in general the judicial mutual
assistance with the United States is accomplished under Article 7
of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Nar-
cotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances ('Vienna Conven-
tion") .36
As part of the Lockheed Agreement, the United States and
Colombia agreed to share any relevant information or materials
available to them. The parties were to keep all correspondence
and information confidential, and the information could not be
disclosed "to third parties or to government agencies having no
law enforcement responsibilities. 37 Cooperation was to be dis-
continued if breach of confidentiality took place.38 Section 5 of
the Lockheed Agreement requires that the parties "use their
best efforts" to supply evidence "in such form as to render it ad-
missible pursuant to the rules of evidence in existence in the
requesting state."39 This section indicates ignorance of two dif-
ferent legal systems.
Sharing evidence usable in foreign jurisdictions remains
problematic. When the extradition treaty with the United States
was suspended in the early 1990s, attempts were undertaken "to
bring narcotraffickers to justice in Colombia by sharing evidence
with Colombian prosecutors."
40
The experiment was a dismal failure. Some U.S. crimes are
not considered so in Colombia, sentencing guidelines are dif-
ferent and sentence reductions for various kinds of good be-
havior resulted in acquittals or sentences found shockingly
short by U.S. officials and public opinion. In addition, Co-
lombia's then Prosecutor General publicly favored legaliza-
tion. Evidence sharing was discontinued in March 1994, and
35. Procedures for Mutual Assistance in Administration ofJustice in U.S. Connec-
tion with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, Mar. 23, 1976, U.S.-Japan, 27
U.S.T. 946, T.IA.S. No. 8233 [hereinafter Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter].
36. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc E/CONF. 82/15, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Interview with Roberto Antonio Zapata Baez, Chief
of the Judicial Office of the Ministry of Justice, (Feb. 23, 2000) (on file with author).
37. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, supra note 35, § 5.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Ambassador Myles Frechette, Address at the Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies (Oct. 21, 1999).
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has not been resumed.4 '
Poor drafting of legal assistance agreements has generated
frustration, confusion, and enormous misunderstanding. The
common law system of the United States differs greatly from the
inquisitorial civil law system of Colombia.42 Colombian courts
are unfamiliar with the evidentiary rules of the United States,
and the rules used in Colombia seem unusual and at times irreg-
ular to U.S. courts. For this and other reasons, numerous mu-
tual assistance agreements have broken down or never been im-
plemented.
C. The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty of 1980
In 1980, the United States and Colombia signed the Treaty
on Mutual Legal Assistance 43 ("Treaty"). Although the agree-
ment was signed and there was an exchange of notes, the Treaty
was not ratified. This agreement does, however, merit some dis-
cussion. The purpose of the Treaty was to provide for "a broad
range of cooperation in criminal matters," including:
(1) executing requests relating to criminal matters;
(2) taking testimony or statements of persons;
(3) effecting the production, preservation, and authentica-
tion of documents, records, or articles of evidence;
(4) returning to the requesting Party any objects, articles,
or other property or assets belonging to it or obtained
by an accused through offenses;
(5) serving judicial documents, writs, summonses, records
of judicial verdicts, and court judgments or decisions;
(6) effecting the appearance of a witness or expert before a
court of the requesting Party;
(7) locating persons; and
(8) providingjudicial records, evidence, and information.'
The Treaty contained a number of important features worth
41. Id.
42. For more discussion on the differences, see Luz E. Nagle, Colombia's Faceless
Justice: A Necessary Evi Blind Impartiality or Modern Inquisition?, 61 U. PrTr. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2000).
43. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the Republic of Colombia, Aug. 20, 1980,
S. TREAry Doc. No. 11, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
44. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Treaty on Mutual
Legal Assistance Between the United States of America and the Republic of Colombia, signed at
Washington, DC, on Aug. 20, 1980.
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mentioning because the language set the tone for subsequent
conflicts in mutual cooperation between Colombia and the
United States. Article 4 included a significant caveat that al-
lowed either the United States or Colombia to refuse requests
under the Treaty. Article 5(1) (a) permits refusal where assist-
ance would adversely affect the security of the requested State.
This includes cases where assistance would involve the disclosure
of information that is classified for national security reasons.
One commentator perceived this article as a lack of willingness
by the United States to reciprocate upon requests from Colom-
bia.45
Article 14 was a call for further tensions between the coun-
tries since it would cause practical problems in mutual assist-
ance.46 Article 14 obliges each contracting Party to furnish
records or other forms of evidence to the other on the same
condition and to the same extent as it would be available to its
own authorities in similar investigations, proceedings, or trial.
This obligation is consistent with the Treaty's basic requirement
that the requested State follow the same practices and proce-
dures in executing a request for assistance as it normally follows
in domestic investigations or proceedings of similar gravity.
Again, evidence gathering differs in both countries. Colom-
bia lacks rules of evidence or the methodology employed by the
lawyers and courts in the United States. Unlike in the United
States, in Colombia the judge decides what evidence is admissi-
ble. Some evidence is obtained under duress or torture. At
times, corrupt judicial and law enforcement officials manufac-
ture evidence and there are no avenues for the defendant to
make it inadmissible. 47
One commentator perceived Article 12 to be a form of ex-
tradition circumventing an extradition treaty. "Requiring the
transfer of a person in custody for the purpose of confrontation
is nothing more than obtaining a defendant avoiding the pro-
ceedings of an extradition treaty."4" There were several obsta-
cles to this agreement. Mistrust and the differences in the sys-
45. Interview with a noted Colombian lawyer who did not want to be identified for
fear of losing his U.S. visa.
46. Id.
47. For an expanded analysis on the judiciary in Colombia, see Nagle, supra note
42.
48. See supra note 45.
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tems that apply various procedures and methods were some of
the biggest problems. Another problem was the perception that
the United States would not reciprocate.49 One of the more
bothersome sections of the Treaty were Article 1 and Article 10
involving the taking of testimony or statements of persons before
ajudge. In Colombia, there are no rules of evidence as there are
in the United States; the judge performs the cross-examination.
The examination done by a prosecutor or the defense lawyer is
very limited and fails to attack the credibility of a witness or the
admissibility of the evidence. Often the defense lawyer is limited
in his or her intervention. Moreover, the seizure and the return
to the requesting state of objects was also considered an imposi-
tion on Colombia that by then did not have any forfeiture laws.50
There is a huge need for cooperation, understanding, and
accommodation of different legal cultures and systems. Diplo-
macy can lead to successful mutual cooperation or create a fi-
asco. Perhaps the Treaty's downfall stems from it having been
negotiated during a time of tremendous resentment toward the
United States, when the Reagan administration was seen as an
aggressor in Latin America against leftist, unionist, and socialist
movements throughout the region.5 Additionally, the adminis-
tration ofJulio Cesar Turbay Ayala in Colombia was perceived as
attempting to internationalize Colombia's internal problems.5 2
More importantly, Turbay sought to internationalize the mecha-
nisms to confront the internal conflicts. 53 The last two years of
the Turbay's administration were considered years of
subordinated collaboration with Washington D.C. regarding bi-
lateral and multilateral issues. The political climate bred antago-
nism and contempt toward the United States. 54
Recognizing that crime continued to flourish, Colombia
and the Untied States tried various avenues to develop a frame-
49. Interview with a highly placed Colombian criminal defense lawyer who did not
wish to be named.
50. Id.
51. For a detailed background on the era, see PEARCE, supra note 7, at 152, 153-54,
195. This was when the so-called "Dirty War" emerged in Colombia between the drug
lords, the army, businessmen, landowners, and political bosses tasked with killing guer-
rillas and left-wing civilian activists. Id.
52. JAIME ARocHA & SANCHEZ G. GONZALO, COLOMBIA: VIOLENCIA Y DEMocRACIA
244A9 (4th ed. 1995).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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work for cooperation to combat the borderless crimes that
narcotraffickers commit. In 1989, the United States, under the
terms of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1989, 5 con-
tinued with the war on drugs, pledging more than US$240 mil-
lion in military and economic aid to Bolivia, Colombia, and
Peru. Congress agreed to fund and provide training and mate-
rial support for various Colombian military operations56 includ-
ing interdiction and eradication, economic support such as
"crop substitution programs and alternative employment oppor-
tunities,"57 and multilateral support for developing an "interna-
tional antinarcotics force for the Western Hemisphere." 8 In ex-
change for U.S. support, the countries identified under the Con-
trol Act were obligated to strengthen respect for and adhere to
human rights standards generally accepted under international
law.59 Countries in compliance with human rights standards
would be granted debt relief on principal and interest owed to
the U.S. government under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.60
Furthermore, if the targeted countries performed according to
the terms of the Control Act, Congress would direct the Presi-
dent to review "whether the International Coffee Agreement ne-
gotiations should be resumed and whether the trade benefits
provided in the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (19
U.S.C. 2701 and following) should be extended to the major
coca producing countries of Latin America."6 ' The Control Act
was a good example of "carrot and stick diplomacy."
Approximately one year later, the Declaration of Carta-
55. In the accompanying statement at the time of signing, President Bush acknowl-
edged that "international cooperation is essential if drug traffickers are to be defeated,
and the United States, in particular, must be generous in providing assistance." See
Presidential Statement, 25 WEEU.Y ComP. PRs. Doc. (Dec, 13, 1989). The Interna-
tional Narcotics Control Act of 1989 (or "Control Act") included provisions for activi-
ties such as spraying and eradication, crop substitution, training of anti-narcotics forces,
and multilateral cooperation on interdiction. The Clinton proposal is more of the
same, which makes one wonder that if the efforts did not succeed in the early 1990s,
then what makes one think more of the same will work now?
56. International Narcotics Control Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-231, § 3(c) (d),
103 Stat. 1954, 1954.
57. Id. § 2(a)(1), (2).
58. Id. § 11(a)(1).
59. Id. § 3(a) (3). Some could view these provisions as a way for the United States
to wipe its hands of any human rights abuses occurring as a result of the United States.
60. Id. § 10(a); Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. 2371 (1994).
61. Id. § 9(b).
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gena62 ("Declaration") signed by Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and
the United States in February 1990, set forth the agenda for the
1990s for mutual cooperation in the war against drugs. While
economic assistance, alternative development and crop substitu-
tion, and trade initiatives were at the forefront of the Declara-
tion, the goal was to promote the idea that suppression of coca
production and trade would result in significant, immediate, and
long-term economic costs that would affect each of the Andean
countries in various ways. The Declaration hoped to set an
agenda for the signatories to "cooperate to identify the type of
assistance required,"63 and implement new cooperation pro-
grams primarily for the years 1991 through 1994. Significantly,
the Declaration stressed the importance of trade and private in-
vestment in the region as being "essential to facilitate sustained
economic growth and to offset the economic dislocations result-
62. 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRm. Doc. 248 (Dec. 13, 1989). The Declaration of Carta-
gena ("Declaration") stated:
The Parties consider that a strategy which commits the Parties to implement
or strengthen a comprehensive, intensified anti-narcotics program must ad-
dress the issues of demand reduction, consumption and supply. Such a strat-
egy also must include understandings regarding economic cooperation, alter-
native development, encouragement of trade and investment, as well as under-
standings on attacking the traffic in illicit drugs, and on diplomatic and public
diplomacy initiatives.
The Parties recognize that these areas are interconnected and self-reinforcing.
Progress in one area will help achieve progress in others. Failure in any of
them will jeopardize progress in the others. The order in which they are ad-
dressed in the document is not meant to assign to them any particular priority.
Economic cooperation and international initiatives cannot be effective unless
there are concomitant, dynamic programs attaching the production of, traf-
ficking in and demand for illicit drugs. It is clear that to be fully effective,
supply reduction efforts must be accompanied by significant reduction in de-
mand.
The Parties recognize that the exchange of information on demand control
programs will benefit their countries.
The Parties recognize that the nature and impact of the traffic in and interdic-
tion of illicit drugs varies in each of the three Andean countries and cannot be
addressed fully in this document. The Parties will negotiate bilateral and mul-
tilateral agreements, consistent with their anti-narcotics efforts, specifying
their responsibilities and commitments with regard to economic cooperation
and intensified enforcement actions.
Id.
63. Id. § 2.
64. Id. § I(A).
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ing from any effective program against illicit drugs. '65 Now,
some ten years later, forty percent of the Colombian territory is
under guerrilla control, one third of the countryside is under
coca cultivation,66 and foreign investment is under attack by
guerrilla and paramilitary combatants. Much of the guerrilla
conflict concerns the presence of foreign investment in Colom-
bia, particularly investments involving exploitation of Colom-
bia's natural resources. It seems somewhat obvious that during
the decade following the Declaration, little was accomplished
with regard to the Declaration's goals.
D. Mutual Assistance Agreement of 1991
Other mutual assistance agreements perfected between the
United States and Colombia include a 1991 agreement to pre-
vent the illegal flow of precursor chemicals to Colombia for the
manufacture of cocaine,67 and an important long-arm coopera-
tive agreement regarding the seizure of assets acquired from
narcotrafficking. 68 Under the latter agreement, Colombia ac-
knowledges its policy of cooperation with the United States, and
obliges itself to provide assistance to the "United States in investi-
gations and proceedings involving or related to the seizure and
forfeiture of the property and proceeds of illicit trafficking in
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances or any criminal activ-
ity connected therewith."69 Colombia is to assist the United
States by "providing information and evidence to be used in pro-
ceedings relating to the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure
or forfeiture of property or proceeds."7
There are several problems with Colombia's rhetorical com-
mitments. In order to seek certification by the United States and
to comply with its commitment related to asset forfeiture, Co-
65. Id. § 3.
66. See General Barry McCaffrey, Debates over New Aid Package for Colombia: All Things
Considered, N.P.R., Feb. 15, 2000 (containing McCaffrey's briefing to Congress).
67. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the
Government of the United States of America on Measures to Prevent the Diversion of
Essential Chemicals, signed February 25, 1991.
68. Memorandum Of Understanding Between the United States and Colombia
Concerning Cooperation in the Seizure and Forfeiture of Property and Proceeds of
Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs, signed at Bogoti, July 24, 1990, D.O.S. 90-230,
C.T.I.A. Num. 1066.0001990.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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lombia enacted a law providing for asset-forfeiture when the as-
sets were acquired dishonestly.7 Colombia's corrupt Con-
gress, 72 however, passed a law with several problems. The law
fails to prevent foreclosures, cancellation of bank accounts,
transfer of title deeds to front men, or fabrication of mortgages.
Also, lack of intelligence prompts the failure to implement effec-
tively this law. Traffickers change their names to avoid authori-
ties locating their properties. They set up front companies or
non-profit companies, relinquish their rights to foundations with
non-profit purposes, or present false balance sheets. Colombia
does not have the intelligence or trained personnel capable to
deal with such issues. 75 The Colombian asset forfeiture provi-
sion is far from satisfying the Vienna Convention standards. Per-
haps there is fear that amending the law would threaten the lives
of those lobbying for its improvement.
Colombia has shown patchy resolve to conform to the U.S.
wishes to see drug traffickers brought to justice or their money
taken away. Mutual assistance depends on the ability of the rep-
resentative contact officers, in this case the U.S. and Colombian
Attorney Generals, to bring the agreements into effect. "Mutual
legal assistance problems include instances arising from ques-
tionable members that have ratified the relevant international
conventions or do not have the necessary domestic legislation in
effect."74
Given the level of corruption and incompetence within Co-
lombian justice, political class, and law enforcement, one must
acknowledge that mutual assistance has yielded some successes.
It is difficult to determine the amount of failures that occurred
in relation to each success-or if some of the successes have
been staged sacrifices that were done in order to throw the dogs
off the scent.7 5
71. Law 333 of December 1996 (Colom.).
72. Many members of Congress were involved in "El Caso 8,000" and received
money from the Cali Cartel. For an excellent discussion on the Caso 8,000 and the
corruption of the political class in Colombia, see EDGAR ToRREs, REHENES DE LA MARA
290-320, 509-38 (1998).
73. See supra note 45.
74. Bruce Zagaris, A Brave New World: Recent Developments in Anti-Money Laundering
and Related Litigation Traps for the Unwary in International Trust Matters, 32 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1023, 1033 (1999).
75. Cases in point include allegations that the Cali Cartel played a significant role
in the demise of the Medellin Cartel in order to neutralize the competition for markets
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In addition to drug interdiction and eradication assistance,
Colombia is receiving economic assistance and rule of law assist-
ance in an attempt to stabilize its economy and improve the jus-
tice system. The endeavors are spearheaded by the U.S. Agency
for International Development (or "USAID") .76 With regard to
narcotics control and eradication, the goals are more specific.
in the United States and Europe, and that the Medellin Cartel delivered drug kingpin
Carlos Lehder into the hands of the government when he became a liability due to his
own drug addiction and drug-induced schizophrenia. See Fabio Castill, Losfinetes de la
Cocaina, DocuMETros PERIOD=STICOS, Bogota, 1988. See also ToRRES, supra note 72.
76. For the Fiscal 1999-2000 report to Congress, see U.S. Agency for International
Development, CongressionalPresentation: Colombia FY2000 (visited Apr. 5, 2000) <http:/
/www.info.usald.gov/pubs/cp2000/lac/colombia.hml> (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal). The U.S. Agency for International Development ("USAID")
states that the United States has four objectives in Colombia:
(1) reduction of production and trafficking of illicit drugs; (2) promotion of
participative [sic] local governance in preparation for a negotiated end to the
internal conflict; (3) increased observance of human rights; and, (4) contin-
ued Colombian support to U.S. Hemispheric objectives, including Summit of
the Americas goals and the advancement of free trade.
Id. The report further notes that USAID was slated to withdraw at the start of fiscal year
2000, but the election of President Andres Pastrana in 1998 and his initiatives in the
arena of judicial reform, human rights, and particularly alternative development, pre-
cipitated a change in policy. Id. USAID's efforts are concentrated in these three areas.
Id USAID's current plans include activities in several areas. Id. The first area isJustice
Assistance. Id. USAID apparently wants to introduce a U.S. style court system. They
will do this by training the SuperiorJudicial Council, the Prosecutor General's staff, and
the Public Defender's office. Id. They will also work with the local bar associations,
academics, and the media to "foster the development of ajudicial culture supportive of
the oral process." Id. The second area is Access to the Justice System by the Poor. I&
USAID intends to increase the numbers of public defenders. Id. They also want to
intervene in the Colombian justice system by establishing more "casas dejusticia" in the
community, and refer legal conflicts to these officials. Id They also plan to introduce
techniques such as Alternative Dispute Resolution, and to assist the public defenders in
managing caseloads. Id The third area of USAID's current plans is Human Rights. Id.
USAID plans to facilitate prosecution of human rights violations by paramilitaries,
FARC guerillas, and the Colombian military. Id They plan to do this by strengthening
the Vice President and Attorney General, the Prosecutor General's human rights unit,
and the Human Rights Ombudsman. The fourth area is Civil Society. Id. USAID will
help build a coalition of Colombian organizations engaged in civic education, conflict
resolution and reconciliation, and will help establish a "Challenge Fund" to encourage
Colombian and international financing of innovation and support activities for conflict
resolution and reconciliation. Id. USAID is concerned that the most egregious human
rights violators are virtually immune from prosecution. Id USAD's next current activ-
ity is the National Legislature. Id. At Colombia's request, USAID plans to modernize
administrative/committee functions in the Colombian legislature, and try to increase
popular access through mechanisms such as public hearings. Id. They wish to get the
ability to oversee judicial discipline to the Legislature. I& The final area is the war with
FARC. Id. FARC guerrillas control 40% of the rural area in the south and east. Id.
They rely on the drug trade for assistance and prey on local populations. Id USAID
U.S. MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA
They are to "[e]liminate the cultivation of opium poppy, coca
leaf, and marijuana; [s] trengthen host nation capabilities to dis-
rupt and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations and
prevent their resurgence; and [d] estroy the cocaine and heroin
processing industries and stop the diversion of licit chemicals
into illicit channels. 77
Joint cooperation has continued at a steady pace since 1989,
even though problems with Ernesto Samper's administration's
ties to drug trafficking led to temporary setbacks between the
two countries. Efforts got back on track with Colombian Presi-
dent Andres Pastrana coming into office and with the penning
of an agreement during his October 28, 1998 state visit in which
he and President Clinton signed a Counternarcotics Alliance
("Alliance"). Pursuant to the Alliance, both nations will work
jointly in a number of areas, from aerial eradication to money
laundering, and the ultimate goal is to stem the flow of narcotics
from Colombia to the United States.
E. 1997 Agreement to Suppress illicit Traffic by Sea
Since the mid-1990s, the maritime transportation of illicit
drugs off Colombia's Pacific and Atlantic coasts have increased
dramatically. This period corresponded with decertification.
Perhaps due in part to decertfication, the Colombian govern-
ment was pressured into signing the Agreement to Suppress Il-
licit Traffic by Sea7' ("Sea Agreement") in 1997. The Sea Agree-
ment signaled an end to six years of Colombia refusing to allow
the U.S. Coast Guard to board Colombian vessels outside Colom-
bian waters.79 In one of the largest single Colombian cocaine
seizures, a U.S. naval vessel recently intercepted a fishing boat in
the Pacific laden with six tons of cocaine. 0 Usually traffickers go
wants to work as an intermediary between the government and FARC to reduce the
conflict's scope. Id.
77. Fact Sheet Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (last modified Apr. 23, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcot-
ics law/fs_colombia.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
78. The Agreement to Suppress Illicit Traffic by Sea was signed between the
United States and Colombia on February 20, 1997 [hereinafter Sea Agreement].
79. Ambassador Myles Frechette, Paper presented at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (Oct. 21, 1999) (on file with the Fordham International Law
Jourano.
80. Jared Kotler, 6 Tons of Cocaine Seized in Pacific Assoc. PRESS, Feb. 17, 2000,
available in 2000 WL 14321542.
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from the north coast of Colombia to the remote Bahamian is-
lands. There, drugs are loaded onto high-speed boats for a final
run to the United States. Another corridor transits the eastern
Caribbean. There the drugs are "repackaged as domestic freight
and transported north by cargo or courier via busy airports with
perfunctory customs checks.""'
Traffickers decided to shift from air transportation to sea
passage because of successful U.S. Southern Command's in-
terdiction efforts against the Peru-Colombia air-bridge. 2 This
change to maritime transportation, however, brought different
challenges for law enforcement. Targets became "more numer-
ous, harder to sort, tougher to monitor undetected, and espe-
cially hard to detect when hidden in bulk commercial cargo. '8 3
Moreover, the Colombian navy lacked the tools, equipment, and
training required to detect, follow, and seize high-speed boats
crossing the Caribbean. This gap in interdiction needed to be
filled. Finally, in 1997, Colombia was compelled to cooperate
more adequately in the interdiction of narcotrafficking by the
sea.
The Sea Agreement improves cooperation between mari-
time forces. In scope, the U.S.-Colombian agreement is similar
to the "Ship Rider" agreements between the United States and
most of the Caribbean nations.84 Under Ship Rider agreements,
the United States can operate within the waters of signatory
countries and board vessels under foreign flags suspected of
smuggling.85 The goal of Ship Rider agreements, according to
81. Jerome L. McElroy, The Caribbean Narco-Economy, CHmiST. SCi. MON., Jan. 6,
2000, at 9.
82. Questions for the Record from the September 12, 1996Joint Hearing on Interdiction
Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation, and the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control (vis-
ited Apr. 5, 2000) <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/960912q.htm> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
83. Id.
84. See Corrine Barnes, Narcotics: Driven from Latin America, Smugglers Eye Caribbean,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 26, 2000.
85. Id. Corrine Barnes stated:
In 1996, Caribbean governments signed a "Ship Rider" agreement which
gave U.S. officials permission to board vessels in Caribbean countries' waters
to check for drugs.
That agreement was aimed at making it easier for countries to work to-
gether and intercept a greater number of high-speed boats [going] their way
from South America and up the Caribbean islands.
"The Ship Rider agreement has had some effect, although the speed
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U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, is "to construct a web
of legal arrangements and law enforcement actions that will dis-
courage international criminals from acting, and leaving no
place to hide if they do."86 The transshipment of drugs across
the Caribbean has continued to flourish,87 if for no other reason
than that the high-speed boats used by traffickers can evade al-
most all naval vessels from the United States and cooperating
countries. It is now estimated that up to forty percent of the
drugs that reach the United States pass through the Caribbean.88
According to General McCaffrey, the Ship Rider agreements and
the Colombia Sea Agreement (or "Sea Agreement") should
prove successful in curtailing or slowing down the maritime ship-
ment of drugs.89
It is interesting to note that almost immediately following
the signing of the Sea Agreement, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia
Myles Frechette sent a letter to Colombia's Minister of National
boats that these traffickers use-no U.S. orJamaican Coast Guard can match
the speed of those boats. We would need aircraft to follow them," said [Berris
Spence, senior superintendent of police in charge of the narcotics division in
Jamaica).
Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. (noting that it was estimated that by beginning of 1999, "more than 40
percent of the drugs that reach the United States pass through the Caribbean").
88. Id.
89. General Barry Mccaffrey, Director of Wite House Office of Drug Control Policy Foreign
Press Center Briefing on His Trip to Haiti and Jamaica and the Upcoming Regional Caribbean
Drug Control Conference in Miami, National Press Club, FED. NEws SERV., Oct. 8, 1998.
When asked by a reporter about the success of the ship rider agreements, General Mc-
Caffrey responded:
I think probably the most impressive thing that has come out of the Bar-
bados Summit, has been some steady success in building, not a series of bina-
tional cooperations, but a multinational sense about all this. So, Joint Inter-
agency Task Force East in Key West, Florida, has become the focal point for a
series of multinational conferences. Part of that were . ship rider agreements
with various nations. And one of them that is worth commenting on, is the
Jamaica-U.S. cooperation, in which there have been some extremely signifi-
cant seizures, and increasingly professional cooperation between Jamaica and
the United States. But I might add, this is also going on in Haiti.
The Coast Guard has gone from nothing to 96 people and seven opera-
tional vessels, in the space of 18 months. And there were actually seven signifi-
cant seizures of cocaine by the Haitian Coast Guard in the last year, a very
professional organization. And they put ship riders aboard U.S. Coast Guard
vessels operating both in the bay and off the south shore. So I think the ship
rider agreements are going to make a huge difference.
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Defense notifying him that in accordance with Clause 10 of the
Sea Agreement, the United States had authorized U.S. Coast
Guard enforcement detachments "to embark on warships and
other vessels on government service to the United Kingdom in
order to engage in operations to suppress illicit traffic by sea."90
Within five days, the Colombian government acknowledged the
authorization of warships and vessels of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands also to carry U.S. Coast Guard enforcement detach-
ments.91
Under the Sea Agreement, if there is reasonable ground to
suspect involvement in illicit traffic, then a party can board and
search private or commercial vessels of the nationality or registry
of either party "when found seaward of the territorial sea of any
State."92 Each party also consents to detect and monitor suspect
vessels and aircraft located in its territorial waters and airspace.
To do so,
[t]he Parties undertake to develop procedures and identify
and employ technical equipment needed to improve timely
communication between their operations centers and employ
other assets, so that detection and tracking of suspect vessels
and aircraft, located in the territorial waters and airspace of
each Party, is conduct and maintained by their own authori-
ties and that suspect vessels and aircraft can be brought by
them under their control.93
The Sea Agreement also sets forth the implementation pro-
cedures for requesting stopping and boarding suspect vessels.
The most interesting aspect of the request/reply process is that,
"[i]f the requested Party has not responded to the request for
authorization to board and search within three (3) hours of re-
ceipt of the request, it shall be understood that the authorization
has been granted."94 Prior to the agreement, the United States
could take no action until permission was granted by the Colom-
90. Letter from Myles Frechette, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, to General Guil-
lerno Gonzalez Mosquera, Colombian Minister of National Defense (Feb. 20, 1999) (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
91. Letter from General Guillermo Gonzalez Mosquera, Colombian Minister of
National Defense, to Maria Mejia V6lez, Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Feb.
25, 1999) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
92. See Sea Agreement, supra note 78, item 6. Each party exercises sovereignty in
its territorial waters. See id. item 4.
93. Id. item 5.
94. Id. item 8.
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bian embassy, a process that could take all day.15 The authoriza-
tion refers only to the conduct of boarding of vessels of a flag or
the requested State. If the vessel was not of the flag of the re-
quested party, then the requesting party would proceed in ac-
cordance with international law.9 6
The Sea Agreement delineates the conduct of law enforce-
ment officials during boarding and search operations. The offi-
cials should not use firearms unless needed in self-defense or in
the following cases:
(a) To compel the suspect vessel to stop when the vessel has
ignored the respective Party's standard warning to stop;
(b) To maintain order on board the suspect vessel during
the boarding and search or while the vessel is preven-
tively held, when the crew or persons on board resist, im-
pede the boarding and search or try to destroy evidence
of illicit traffic on the vessel, or when the vessel attempts
to flee during the boarding and search or while the vessel
is preventively held.97
According to the Sea Agreement, the use of firearms or
force "shall be the minimum reasonably necessary and propor-
tional under the circumstances."9" This standard, however, is
hard to determine and provisions (a) and (b) are open to rather
broad interpretation. The use of force to compel a vessel to stop
under section (a) has come to include any number of measures.
Most recently, Coast Guard MH90 Enforcer helicopters have car-
ried snipers using laser sighted .50 caliber Robar rifles to disable
the engines of the high speed "go-fast" smuggling boats.9 The
Coast Guard is also now using high-speed chase boats armed
with machine guns used to fire warning shots across the bows of
the smuggling vessels. "They also use a 'spinball' that showers
rubber pellets and a net to snare boat propellers."10 0
During 1999, the United States maintained military assets in
the region, including "seven P-3 counterdrug upgrade aircraft,
95. Interview with former U.S. Coast Guard boarding officer at Steston University
School of Law, St. Petersburg, FLA (Apr. 15, 2000).
96. Sea Agreement, supra note 78, item 8.
97. Id. item 12.
98. Id.
99. Robin Mitchell, Officials Drawing Bead on Drug Runs, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Sept. 14, 1999, at 1B ("The Coast Guard says go-fasts carry more than 85 percent of all
maritime drug shipments.").
100. Id.
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two Relocatable Over-the-Horizon radars, one E-3 AWACs and
four E-2 surveillance planes, four F-16 fighters, three TAGOS ra-
dar picket boats, and other Navy and Coast Guard warships. ' 0°
The traffickers, however, continue to prove resourceful adversa-
ries:
Traffickers have displayed a remarkable resilience and inge-
nuity in keeping one step ahead of detection. Sophisticated
satellite-positioning systems and the latest communication
technology are often used to coordinate drops in the least
policed waters. To elude U.S. radar, they now use 'stealth
boats' made entirely from wood and fiberglass, as well as
semi-submersible vessels.
10 2
Furthermore, pursuant to the Sea Agreement, the boarding
party must submit a timely report on the events of the operation
to the other party. Moreover, if evidence of drugs is found, a
party can request information "on the status of all investigations,
prosecutions and judicial proceedings resulting from boardings
and searches conducted." 03 This assistance is provided under
Article 7 of the Vienna Convention." 4 Mutual legal assistance
under Article 7, for the purposes of the boarding agreement,
would include taking evidence or statements of persons, effect-
ing services or judicial documents, executing searches and
seizures, examining objects and sites, and providing information
and evidentiary items.'05
F. Customs Service Mutual Assistance Agreement of 1999106
Money laundering is not only connected with drug traffick-
ing, 1 7 but also "is the companion of brutality, deceit and corrup-
101. Tony Capaccio, Kosovo Campaign Weakens Drug War, General Says, 20 DEFENSE
WEEK 18 (1999).
102. McElroy, supra note 81, at 9.
103. Sea Agreement, supra note 78, item 13.
104. Vienna Convention, supra note 36. Under the Vienna Convention, the par-
ties must take legal measures to prohibit, criminalize, and punish all forms of illicit
drug production, trafficking, and drug money laundering, to control chemicals that
can be used to process illicit drugs, and to cooperate in international efforts of these
goals.
105. Id art. 7(2)(a)-(e).
106. Customs Service Mutual Assistance Agreement, Sept. 21, 1999, U.S.-Col., U.S.
Customs Service-Office of International Affairs, Washington, D.C.
107. See THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY & DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE NA-
TIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY FOR 1999 5 (last modified Sept. 1999) <http://
www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/money.pdf> (on file with the Fordham International
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tion." °8 The assault on money laundering is a necessary strategy
in the war on drugs and the fight against organized crime world-
wide. Taking away the money from the traffickers and organized
crime constitutes half the battle. Today, many nations recognize
that they must implement strategies to follow the money and co-
operate with other countries in this endeavor. 10 9 Money laun-
dering takes place when an individual conducts a financial trans-
action with knowledge that the funds or property involved are
the proceeds of a crime, and he intends either to further the
purpose of that crime, or to disguise or conceal the proceeds. 10
During the 1994 Summit of the Americas, the leaders of the
participating nations signed a Declaration of Principles that in-
cluded the commitment to fight drug trafficking and money
laundering."' A ministerial conference followed to study and
agree on a cooperative hemispheric response to fight money
Law Journal) [hereinafter NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY] (representing com-
prehensive strategic implementation of various techniques to be employed to combat
damaging effects of money laundering around world). The National Money Launder-
ing Strategy of 1999 ("National Money Laundering Strategy") is the first report in a
series of five annual reports that are required by the Money Laundering and Financial
Crimes Strategy Act of 1998. There must be an underlying predicate offense or crime,
such as drug trafficking, that assisted in generating the money that is being laundered.
Id. at 5-6. "The money laundering statute now extends to the proceeds of more than
170 separate offenses." Id. at 16.
108. See Office of Public Affairs, Treasury and Justice Release Money Laundering Strat-
egy (last modified Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/92399.htm>
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (quoting Treasury Secretary Law-
rence Summers).
109. See Barry R. McCaffrey, Speech, Efforts To Combat Money Laundering, 20 Loy.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. Lj. 791, 791 (1998); see also National Money Laundering Strategy,
supra note 107, at 66.
110. See Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act, 31 U.S.C.
5340(2) (A) (1998); see also NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 107, at
14 (describing that law enforcement experts have divided process of money laundering
into three stages). The first stage is placement, and involves putting the illicit funds
into the financial system. Id. The second stage is layering, whereby the illegal funds are
moved and transferred between various nations and financial institutions in order to
conceal the origin of the funds and to suggest a legitimate source for the funds. Id.
The third stage is integration, and occurs when the funds are transferred again, how-
ever at this point the launderer moves the funds back into working capital in order to
refinance the continuing illegal activities. Id.
111. The governments acknowledged that illegal drug and related criminal activi-
ties were grave threats not only to the societies, but also to free market economies and
democratic institutions of the hemisphere. See Summit of the Americas Plan of Action (vis-
ited Apr. 5, 2000) <http://www.summit-americas.org/miamiplan.htm> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal). They committed themselves to:
Ratify the 1988 United Nations Convention against the Illicit Traffic of
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laundering.'12  The conference created awareness that money
laundering was not just a law enforcement issue, but a financial
and economic issue, which required the coordination of inter-
agencies. At the 1998 Summit of the Americas, the leaders
agreed to "[e]ncourage financial institutions to redouble their
efforts to prevent money laundering and the appropriate busi-
ness sectors to strengthen its controls to prevent the diversion of
chemical precursors."13 The leaders also agreed to give full sup-
port to the June 1998 Special Session of the U.N. General Assem-
Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances and make it a criminal offense to laun-
der the proceeds of all serious crimes.
Enact legislation to permit the freezing and forfeiture of the proceeds of
money laundering and consider the sharing of forfeited assets among govern-
ments.
As agreed by ministers and representatives of Caribbean and Latin Ameri-
can governments in the Kingston Declaration, November 5-6, 1992, imple-
ment the recommendations of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering and work to adopt the Model Regulations of the Inter-
American Commission on Drug Abuse Control ("CICAD").
Encourage financial institutions to report large and suspicious transac-
tions to appropriate authorities and develop effective procedures that would
allow the collection of relevant information from financial institutions.
Work individually and collectively to identify the region's narcotics traf-
ficking and money laundering networks, prosecute their leaders, and seize as-
sets derived from these criminal activities.
Adopt programs to prevent and reduce the demand for and the consump-
tion of illicit drugs.
Adopt effective and environmentally-sound national strategies to prevent
or reduce substantially the cultivation and processing of crops used for the
illegal drug trade, paying particular attention to national and international
support for development programs that create viable economic alternatives to
drug production.
Pay particular attention to the control of precursor chemicals and sup-
port comprehensive drug interdiction strategies.
Strengthen efforts to control firearms, ammunition, and explosives to
avoid their diversion to drug traffickers and criminal organizations.
Hold a working-level conference, to be followed by a ministerial confer-
ence, to study and agree on a coordinated hemispheric response, including
consideration of an inter-American convention, to combat money laundering.
Convene a hemispheric-wide conference of donors, including multilateral
development banks and UN agencies, to seek resources for alternative devel-
opment programs aimed at curbing the production, trafficking, and use of
illicit drugs, and the rehabilitation of addicts.
Support the discussion the OAS has initiated with the European Union
on measures to control precursor chemicals.
Support the convening of a global counter-narcotics conference.
Id.
112. Id. The ministerial conference was held in December 1995 in Argentina.
113. Second Summit of the Americas Plan of Action (visited Apr. 5, 2000) <http://
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bly to promote international cooperation with respect to illicit
drugs and related crimes. The states were to ensure effective im-
plementation of international narcotics agreements' 4 to which
they subscribed, at regional and sub-regional levels." 5
On September 21, 1999, after considering that "[o]ffenses
against customs laws are prejudicial to the economic, fiscal and
commercial interests of their respective countries," and after rec-
ognizing "[t]he need for international cooperation in matters
related to the application and enforcement of the customs laws
of their respective countries," the United States and Colombia
entered into a bilateral agreement to facilitate joint efforts in
combating international money laundering activities. The Cus-
toms Service' 6 negotiated a mutual assistance agreement to co-
ordinate joint investigations with the Colombian law enforce-
ment agencies of the National Tax and Customs Directorate.
This customs-oriented agreement encourages information ex-
change on criminal matters, including money laundering." 7
The information is provided upon request or on an agency's
own initiative.'
Article 2 of the Customs Service Mutual Assistance Agree-
ment of 1999 ("Customs Service Agreement") sets forth its
scope, and provides that the Customs Administrations shall co-
operatively assist each other in the prevention, investigation, and
repression of any offense." 9 The Customs Administrations may
provide assistance to each other in the form of information relat-
ing to successful techniques that have been employed to prevent
and combat offenses, 20 special enforcement actions that may be
beneficial in preventing and combating offenses,12 ' and new
methods that are commonly being used in the commission of
vw.summit-americas.org/chileplan.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journao.
114. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 7, para. 1-2 (stating that parties can
obtain evidence from other countries party to it without need to use cumbersome, time
consuming letters rogatory process).
115. See Second Summit of the Americas Plan of Action, supra note 113.
116. The Customs agency is one of several agencies with responsibility to investi-
gate crimes involving money laundering. Other agencies include the IRS, the Secret
Service, the DEA, and the FBI.
117. Customs Service Mutual Assistance Agreement, supra note 106, art. 3-4.
118. Id. art. 3(2).
119. Id. art. 2(l).
120. Id. art. 3(2)(b).
121. Id. art. 3(2)(c).
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offenses. 122 The Customs Service Agreement also requires that
the Customs Administrations cooperate with each other in
"[e]stablishing and maintaining channels of communication to
facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information .... "125
The Customs Service Agreement further provides for the
surveillance and exchange of information regarding persons
known or suspecting of having committed an offense, 124 the il-
licit traffic of goods towards the territory of the other Customs
Administration, 25 the suspected means of transport being used
in the commission of offenses within the borders of the other
Customs Administration, 26 and the sources and methods of pay-
ments that are presumed to have been involved in the commis-
sion of an offense.'27 This last provision can necessarily be used
in efforts relating to asset forfeiture because information per-
taining to the sources and methods of payments can lead to the
detection of other money and property that may have been di-
rectly or indirectly related to another offense, and thus can be
forfeited. The Customs Service Agreement addresses asset for-
feiture as well, and grants the transfer of forfeited property and
funds to the respective Customs Administrations. 28 Addition-
ally, all information that is shared between the Customs Adminis-
trations must be kept confidential, and may only be used or dis-
closed for the purposes specified in the Customs Service Agree-
ment, including use of the information in investigative, judicial,
and administrative proceedings. 29
Under Article 6 of the Customs Service Agreement, a coun-
try can request employees or experts of Customs Administrations
to appear in judicial or administrative procedures and produce
documents considered essential for "corresponding proce-
dures."' The employees and experts will have all necessary
protection and support offered by the requesting Customs Ad-
ministration who will also pay all expenses.'-'
122. Id. art. 3(2)(d).
123. Id. art. 3(3)(a).
124. Id. art. 4(2)(a).
125. Id. art. 4(2)(b).
126. Id. art. 4(2)(c).
127. Id. art. 4(2)(d).
128. Id. art. 4(5)(b).
129. Id. art. 9(1) and art. 9(2).
130. Id. art. 6(1).
131. Id. art. 6(2).
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G. The Black Market Peso Exchange
The Colombian Black Market Peso Exchange (or "Black
Peso") is the largest most prevalent and sophisticated form of
money laundering in the Western Hemisphere, with as much as
US$5 billion in drug proceeds being moved through major U.S.
cities every year.'1 2 The Black Peso has a dramatic impact on the
economies of the countries affected.
The Black Peso is not a result of the drug industry. It grew
in the 1950s in response to restrictions the government placed
on Colombians' access to U.S. dollars.' The Colombian gov-
ernment restricted the supply of U.S. dollars in order to enforce
compliance with trade policies, tariffs, and taxes of goods sold in
Colombia. A "parallel currency exchange system" 34 was created
when Colombians turned to "the black market and dollar/peso
brokers grew up to meet the demand."13
To attack both black market and narcotics enterprises, the
United States and Colombia needed to join forces' 36 to protect
the financial system, stop the free flow of narco-dollars into legit-
imate business, and put the Black Market exchanger out of busi-
ness. The Black Peso is a very sophisticated form of money laun-
dering by which no money crosses any borders. To curtail the
Black Peso required a special agreement involving different
agencies to attack effectively money laundering.
To understand why the Customs Administrations are in-
volved in this, it is important to know the laundering cycle. To
control trade and charge high tariffs on goods imported to Co-
lombia, the Colombian government required importers to
132. See NATIONAL MoNrE" LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 107, at 25.
133. Black Market Peso Exchange: How U.S. Companies Are Used To Launder Money,
Hearing 106th Congress (visited May 9, 2000) <http://drug..caucus.senate.gov/hear-
ings.htm> [hereinafter Black Market] (testimony of Alvin C. James).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Internal Revenue Service (or "IRS") criminal investigations have attacked the
narcotics-related money laundering enterprises. In one major investigation that lasted
from September 1986 to March 1995, the IRS Criminal Investigation unit and other law
enforcement agencies identified and attacked both the Colombian narcotics and Black
Market components of the process. The IRS agents "seized more than $217.0 million in
U.S. and foreign currencies. Over 9,701 kilograms of cocaine were seized with a street
value of more than $146.0 million. More than 450 persons were arrested and prose-
cuted on narcotics and related money laundering charges." The Colombian Black Market
Peso Exchange (last modified Oct. 22, 1997) <http://www.ustreas.gov/irs/ci/congress/
blkmarthtm> (on file with the Fordham International LaoJournal).
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purchase merchandise only in dollars that could only be ob-
tained at the Colombian central bank. The dollar/peso broker
allowed the purchase of dollars without the government's knowl-
edge so that the importer could avoid the Colombian tariffs and
taxes by "smuggling" the goods without government scrutiny.
The broker purchased dollars from Colombian exporters who
then sold goods in the United States and deposited them into
U.S. accounts. The brokers then paid the exporter in pesos in
Colombia. Even though the customers paid a small premium for
the dollars that were passed to them by the broker, it was
cheaper than paying the tariffs and taxes on the goods obtained
in Colombia. At that point, the narco-dollars, the product of
drug trafficking, came into the picture. In the 1970s, massive
amounts of dollars were deposited on a large scale. In reaction,
the U.S. Congress adopted various anti-money laundering laws
to eliminate such transactions and trace the traffickers. These
laws forced Colombian traffickers to seek the help of brokers.
Traffickers have dollars in the United States but need pesos
in Colombia, and brokers have pesos in Colombia and need dol-
lars to sell. The traffickers sell the dollars to the brokers at a
substantial discount.13 7 This system allows drug traffickers from
Colombia to transform exorbitant amounts of U.S. dollars from
the drug trade into Colombian pesos in the traffickers' respec-
tive Colombian bank accounts.138 The Colombian drug traffick-
ers have forged ingenious uses of this "system" to reach their
illegal proceeds. The maneuvering of funds into and through
the broker's network then allows the money to flow into legiti-
mate businesses. Essentially, the dollars that began as illegal
drug proceeds are laundered and returned to the U.S. economy
as legitimate business receipts by businesses that sell merchan-
dise to the Colombian importers.
This money laundering system is summarized as follows.
First, the Colombian traffickers export cocaine to the United
States. Next, the cocaine is sold for money. Then the trafficker
enters into a "contract" and sells the money to the Colombian
Black Market Peso Exchanger. The Colombian Black Market
137. Id.; see also NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 107, at 26
(noting that discount that broker receives as result of this transaction reflects fact that
broker, not drug trafficker, assumes risk of getting U.S. dollars into financial system).
138. See NATiONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 107, at 26.
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Peso Exchanger, or his representative, then introduces the bulk
currency into the U.S. banking system. Then the U.S. dollars are
sold to Colombian importers. The importers next purchase
goods, either from the United States or from collateral markets.
Finally, the goods are transported to Colombia. 39 The whole-
sale value of the cocaine exported to the United States is re-
turned to Colombia in the form of trade goods.14 0
At the conclusion of this transaction, the peso broker be-
comes the money launderer, and the drug trafficker has money
in his or her country's own currency.141 The broker then sells
the dollars at a profit to Colombian citizens seeking U.S. dollars
to purchase goods for resale in Colombia.
42
Four ways have been identified by which the money is
placed into the system: by having employees of the broker place
the money in bank accounts opened in nominee names but con-
trolled by the broker; 4 3 by adding the purchased narcotics cur-
rency to the regular deposit of a business that normally deposits
large amounts of money;'4 by smuggling the money into foreign
banks operating in Mexico; 1 4 and by delivering the money to
the U.S. supplier of trade goods.1 46 The goods enter Colombia
as "contraband" via "smuggling." The supplier ships the goods,
usually electronics, clothing, shoes, liquor, cigarettes, and per-
fume, to the Colombian distributor. The distributor works in
what is known as the "San Andresitos," or areas where foreign
merchandise is sold without duties or tariffs. The prices charged
for the merchandise are significantly reduced and legitimate re-
tailers cannot compete with them. 47
139. See The Colombian Black Market Peso Exchange, supra note 136.
140. This money laundering procedure, which includes smuggling cocaine into
the United States and returning the proceeds to Colombia, has been described as la
vuelta or simply "the round" by traffickers and money launderers identified in an under-
cover operation known as "Operation Polar Cap." Id.
141. Id.
142. &d
143. Black Market; supra note 133.
144. Id.
145. Id,
146. Many suppliers are wholesale distributors or multinational manufacturers
from various countries, many of whom are based in the United States. It is important to
know that the supplier receives wire transfers, checks, or bank drafts that are not drawn
on the account of the Colombian importer. Id.
147. I often frequented the San Andresitos to find cameras, perfume, computers,
and sunglasses at prices lower than those offered in sales in the United States.
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The motive behind the Colombian importers who purchase
the U.S. dollars from the peso brokers is to evade the import
taxes and duties that are necessary to facilitate lawful importing
and exporting between the United States and Colombia. 4 ' The
end result of these illegal transactions is that the Colombian gov-
ernment's attempt to enhance the economic stability of the
country is harmed, while a market of contraband and other
smuggled goods is increased.' 49
The Black Peso has detrimental effects on the fiscal stability
of both the United States and Colombia. The response by the
United States has been to put various mechanisms and strategic
programs in place, such as asset forfeiture, limits on bank se-
crecy, criminalizing of money laundering for serious crimes, su-
pervising of financial institutions, and cooperating internation-
ally with respect to counter-money laundering standards and
regulatory and enforcement matters.
150
The effectiveness of U.S. Customs undercover money laun-
dering operations aimed at Black Peso brokers has revealed that
the U.S. Customs Service is "35 times more effective (seizure val-
ues vs. expenditures), than that of all U.S. government counter-
narcotics programs." 15' In the last eight years, the U.S. Customs
Service has seized more than US$763 million in cash and mone-
tary instruments. The operations caused the arrest of 2000 peo-
ple and the seizure of 94,534 pounds of cocaine.1 2 The two
largest single seizures of cash in the history of federal law en-
forcement were made as a result of U.S. Customs Service under-
cover operations targeting Colombian Black Pesos. One took
place in Miami where US$22 million was seized' 53 and the an-
other occurred in Los Angeles where US$19 million was
seized.' 4 Also in Miami in 1996, the U.S. Customs Service made
the largest cash seizure of US$15 million on its way to Colombia.
Moreover, it was U.S. Customs Service undercover operations
that first exposed the criminal money laundering activities of
148. See NATIONAL MoNEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY, supra note 107, at 27.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 51.
151. See The Colombian Black Market Peso Exchange, supra note 136.
152. See id.
153. See id. (noting that this seizure of cocaine was made under operation Casa-
cam).
154. See id. (stating that this seizure of cocaine was made under operation Omega).
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both the Bank of Credit and Commerce International and Amer-
ican Express Bank International.
155
II. TIE SLIPPERY SLOPE
Mutual assistance agreements have resulted in a number of
other successes, most recently Operation Juno, which disman-
tled a large international money-laundering ring in late 1999.
According to Donnie Marshall, acting U.S. Drug Enforcemnt Ad-
ministration ("DEA") Administrator, "Operation Juno repre-
sents a new level of U.S./Colombian cooperation. This is the
first time Colombian authorities have seized this volume of traf-
ficker accounts based on information derived from ajoint inves-
"1156 evnmrtigation by U.S. law enforcement agencies. An even more
sensational result of mutual assistance has been Operation Mil-
lenium, sprung in October 1999, which Colombian authorities
hailed as "the biggest blow to drug traffickers in four years."157
Operation Millenium, which U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno
described as an "unprecedented collaborative effort between the
United States and Colombia,"" 8 netted thirty traffickers and evi-
dence in Colombia and Mexico as well as significant evidence in
the United States.
Clearly, when pressure is applied to the Colombian govern-
ment, positive results can be achieved. Mutual cooperation by
both countries, however, has not always been forthcoming, and
the blame cannot be laid wholly on Colombia's doorstep. Ac-
cording to Florida's Republican Congressman John Mica:
Time and again, the Clinton administration has ignored the
emerging situation in Colombia, despite congressional over-
sight hearings that have tried repeatedly to call attention to
the impending crisis. In short, despite years of congressional
pleas for assistance to Colombia, countless hearings and in-
tense congressional efforts, resources approved by Congress
have failed even after all of that to be provided to Colombia.
155. Id.
156. U.S. Department ofJustice, Statement by Acting DEA Administrator Donnie
R Marshall on Operation Juno (last modified Dec. 22, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/
dea/pubs/pressrel/pr991222.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
157. CN World View: More than 30 Suspects Seized in U.S.-Colombian Drug Sting Opera-
tion (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 13, 1999) (Transcript # 99101305V18).
158. Michael Kirkland, U.S., Colombia Snap Alleged Drug Ring, UNrTD PREss, Oct.
13, 1999.
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To borrow a phrase, the record is a "flipping disaster."
159
The United States is now dealing with a situation where Co-
159. Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources Committee on
Government Reform (Feb. 15, 2000) <http://www.house.gov/reform/cj/hearings/
00.02.15/opening.htm> (testimony ofJohn L. Mica, Chairman) (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Government Reform Hearing]. Congressman
Mica's remarks merit reprinting here:
First, information sharing was denied in 1994, turning the situation into
"chaos" as my colleague from California Steve Horn so aptly described.
As you'll recall, as of May 1, 1994, the Department of Defense decided
unilaterally to stop sharing real-time intelligence regarding aerial traffic and
drugs with both Colombia and Peru. Now, as I understand it, that description,
which hasn't been completely resolved, has thrown diplomatic relations with
host countries into chaos. That was a comment in a hearing by Congressman
Steve Horn, August 2, 1994. And I've put that up for the subcommittee to
review.
In 1996 and 1997, when this administration decertified Colombia without
a national interest waiver, it severely undermined the legitimate drug-fighting
efforts of General Serrano and the Colombian National Police, cutting off In-
ternational Military Education Training ("IMET") and critical equipment to
that country. Even worse today, the absence of U.S. intelligence sharing, due
in part to the reduced air coverage after the forced closure of Howard Air
Force Base in Panama, our drug counter-efforts in the region have been fur-
ther crippled.
We held a hearing on this GAO report, and I think it was quite enlighten-
ing to see that even pleas by the United States ambassador from Peru asking
that, in fact, the surveillance flights be kept up, and also warning that if we
didn't participate, that in fact we would see a more-I'm sorry, more cocaine
coming out of Peru and also out of Colombia. In fact, that prediction in '98
has come true because in fact we have not paid attention to the requests even
of officials of this administration who are on the front line.
While very publicly calling for $1.6 billion in emergency aid last month at
the White House, this administration requested only $85 million in State De-
partment (INL) funding for Colombia in the fiscal year 2000. The Congress
passed a supplemental aid package to increase the funding for counternarcot-
ics work in Colombia. Sadly, less than half of the equipment Congress funded
in that bill has been delivered in an operational fashion.
In fact, we found, up till just a few weeks ago, that the three helicopters,
which account for the bulk of aid dollars, when finally delivered, sat idle for
lack of proper armoring or ammunition.
The headline that's put up there is interesting, because that's not the
headline from a few weeks ago. This is a headline from 1998, Washington
Times, "Delay of helicopters hobbles Colombia in stopping drugs," and as I
said, we've been trying for years to get this equipment on line in a real war on
drugs. We find ourself in the same situation when we can't get three helicop-
ters to Colombia with proper armoring and ammunition even in the last few
months.
Another story that appeared in the paper and, again, I haven't confirmed
this but I'm told that it's certain, that the ammunition we asked to get to Co-
lombia was delivered during the holidays to the loading docks of the State
Department. It appears that, unfortunately, we have a gang that can shoot
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lombia's existence is in grave peril, and future agreements be-
tween the countries will have grave consequences for the United
States. The situation threatens to take the United States careen-
ing down a slippery slope into direct involvement in a foreign
country's civil war and political turmoil in order to achieve U.S.
foreign policy and domestic agenda goals. If the United States
wants to end narcotrafficking in the country, then it must deal
with Colombia's political and economic crises, specifically the
fifty year old guerrilla insurgency. The prospect of another Viet-
nam looms large over U.S. policymakers in the new millenium.
Early in 1999, Colombian President Pastrana, in an attempt
to rectify his country's problems, formulated a policy of reforms
and measures dubbed Plan Colombia 16 1 (or "Plan") with the
assistance of the U.S. Department of State. 161 Among other
goals, the US$7.5 billion plan promotes "a comprehensive strat-
egy to counter drug trafficking, improve the performance of the
armed forces, and win the confidence of civilians."' 62 The Co-
lombian government supposedly will put up US$4 billion from
its own resources,1 63 although where that money will come from
cannot be determined. The balance of the funding for the Plan
straight or get the ammunition to shoot straight to Colombia where it's
needed.
This administration, unfortunately, has resisted congressional efforts to
ensure that needed drug-fighting equipment makes it to Colombia in a timely
manner. This administration has fought the Congress for years on Black
Hawk utility helicopters for the Colombian National Police, and unfortu-
nately, has a pathetic track record of delivering the assistance. And I've
shown, again, that we're back here looking at-trying to get these resources to
where we know they're needed.
Unfortunately, nearly half of the $954 million that is provided in the sup-
plemental aid package for Colombia is for 30 Black Hawk helicopters for the
Colombian military, again, which we requested years and years ago to be on
line in Colombia to fight this battle. Given the high cost of these assets and
the poor delivery track record of the State Department, I'm concerned about
committing this amount of money to a program that has not worked well in
the past. As chairman of this subcommittee, I want to ensure that the final aid
package contains funds for programs that have a proven track record of suc-
cess, and also we figure out some way to get this equipment there in a timely
fashion.
Id.
160. Plan Colombia (visited Apr. 5, 2000) <http://www.presidencia.gov.co/web-
presi/plancolo/plancolo.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
161. Id.
162. Jason Feer, Failure of US Congress To Boost Aid to Colombia Likely To Increase Viw-
lence, OIL DAILY, Dec. 7, 1999.
163. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Colombia Assistance Package
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would come from international assistance: US$2.7 billion from
the International Monetary Fund (already approved),'164 possibly
US$3 billion forthcoming from the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank, and at least US$3.5 billion in for-
eign aid from other countries.
With the Plan in hand, President Pastrana came to the
United States last summer to ask President Clinton and Congress
to be the vanguard for international assistance. The Plan is
largely dependent on significant funding and logistical support
from the United States. In response, the White House and Re-
publican lawmakers in the U.S. Senate have each proposed new
aid packages of approximately US$1.6 billion, each over two to
three years. Georgia's Republican Senator Paul Coverdell intro-
duced a congressional bill, the Alliance with Colombia and the
Andean Region Act of 1999165 ("ALIANZA"). Both aid packages
would supplement significant funds already dedicated to Colom-
bia over the last couple years:
In FY98, the U.S. Government, through INL, provided Co-
lombia with $43 million in support of counternarcotics opera-
tions, an additional $14 million for helicopter upgrades, and
approximately $21 million in aviation support and $41 mil-
lion in equipment and services drawn from U.S. stockpiles.
In FY99, U.S. support will grow to approximately $203 million
(including $96 million for six Black Hawk helicopters) mak-
ing Colombia the largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the
hemisphere and the third, after Israel and Egypt, globally.' 66
Fact Sheet, (last modifiedJan. 11, 2000) <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/
commentary/011100b.html> (on file with the Fordham International LawJournao.
164. 2000 Foreign Policy Overview and the President's Fiscal Year 2001 Foreign Affairs
Budget Reques (Feb. 8, 2000)<http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/testimony/wtalbright
020800.html> [hereinafter 2000 Foreign Policy Overview] (testimony of Madeleine K. Al-
bright, Secretary of State).
165. Alliance with Colombia and the Andean Region Act of 1999, S. 1758, 106th
Cong. (1999) [hereinafter ALLANZA]. The bill was introduced to authorize urgent
support for Colombia and front line states to secure peace and the rule of law, to en-
hance the effectiveness of anti-drug efforts that are essential to impeding the flow of
deadly cocaine and heroin from Colombia to the United States, and for other purposes.
-d. § 2.
166. U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law En-
forcement Affairs, INL County Programs-Colombia, (visited Jan. 15, 2000) <http://
www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics-law/fsColombia.html> (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal); see also Steven Dudley, Colombian Rebels Resume Attacks as Truce
Ends; Strikes Follow U.S. Aid Offer, WASH. Posr, Jan. 13, 2000, at A13.
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A. The White House Proposal
According to information issued by the U.S. Agency for In-
ternational Development, an organization long involved in rule
of law and administration of justice programs in Colombia, 167
assistance to Colombia is to proceed in four prongs.168 The first
prong is reducing production and trafficking of illicit drugs.
The second prong is to promote participatory local governance
in preparation for a negotiated end to the internal conflict.
Third, Colombia must increase its observance of human rights.
The final prong is continuing Colombian support to U.S. hemi-
spheric objectives, including Summit of the Americas goals and
the advancement of free trade.
General McCaffrey stated that approximately seventy per-
cent of the total package is earmarked for the military and police
as follows: US$600 million to train, equip, transport (thirty
Black Hawk and fifteen UH-1N helicopters), and support three
army anti-narcotics battalions. One battalion is ready for action,
based at Tres Esquinas in Caqueta. 169 U.S. support for these
units will come in the form of improved radar coverage inside
Colombia, and better intelligence flows from the new U.S. air
base at Manta, on Ecuador's Pacific coast. 7 About US$341 mil-
lion will be used for navy and air force anti-narcotics operations
interdiction and US$96 million will be used for police anti-nar-
cotics operations (eradication).7
Pentagon officials have expressed disappointment that the
167. For a detailed discussion of the controversy surrounding USAID's involve-
ment in Colombia, see LAWYERS COMMITE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, REPORT, COLOMBIA:
PUBUC ORDER, PRIVATE INJUSTICE (Feb. 1994); Charles Roberts, Rule of Law and Devel-
opment USAID and the Public Order Courts of Colombia (1995) (unpublished paper,
Georgetown University) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); Nagle,
supra note 42.
168. U.S. Agency for International Development, CongressionalPresentation: Colom-
bia FY 2000 (visited Apr. 5, 2000) <http://vvw.info.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/lac/co-
lombia.html> (on fie with the Fordham International Law Journal).
169. See Jared Kotler, U.S. Army Secretary Predicts Drug War Progress, AP WoRLD-
srREAMi, Jan. 20, 2000 ("The battalion is undergoing 'confidence-building' operations
before being thrust into combat.").
170. The US$600 million will also include other types of aircraft, radar equipment,
and intelligence gathering gear. Also, the U.S. Army is about to deploy a sophisticated
satellite imaging system (ERIM International Eagle Vision II ("EVI")) in the area of
operations in and around Colombia. Use of the system will greatly aid operations of the
63 combat helicopters to be sent to Colombia under the White House proposal. See
Army To Deploy Eagle Vision II to Caribbean, C4I NF.vs 15:3, Feb. 3, 2000.
171. See How To Sell Military Aid Package; Tell U.S. Congress That It Is Not for Counter-
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majority of money that makes Colombia "the largest recipient of
U.S. counternarcotics assistance"172 is going to counternarcotics
operations when the real problem is the guerrillas. 17  This is de-
spite the fact that in 1998, following a disastrous defeat by Co-
lombian military forces at the hands of the largest insurgent
group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ("FARC"),
observers began questioning the Clinton administration's move
to increase the number of military advisers in Colombia from
100 to 223, ostensibly to assist Colombia in its fight against
drugs. 74 At least one Congressman voiced his strong opinion
that the military's primary mission should be to help Colombia
crush the rebels once and for all as was accomplished in Peru
against their narco-guerrillas 75
Contrary to what the White House would wish U.S. citizens
to believe, 76 President Pastrana does not share the will of the
people of Colombia. 77 Colombians want peace, but they are
against ceding half of the country to the unpredictability of guer-
rillas and paramilitaries in order to end the half-century of un-
declared civil war.' 71 U.S. Department of State officials put a
Insurgency, in LA-nN A~mEcRAN REGIONAL REPORTS: ANDEAN GROUP, PEACE & DIPLOMACY,
RA-00-01; 6 (Jan. 25, 2000).
172. INL Country Programs-Columbia, supra note 166.
173. Dettmer, supra note 8, at 9. However, "Colombia inaugurated its first U.S.-
funded 1,000-member rapid deployment force last year." Dudley, supra note 166, at
A13.
174. Editorial, Colombia; U.S. Strategy: Anti-Narcotics or Counter-Insurgency?, DALLAs
MORNING NEws, Mar. 21, 1998, at 28A The editorial stated in part that "The adminis-
tration insists that it is fighting drug traffickers and their allies rather than insurgents.
But that may be sophistry. Let's cut to the chase: Is the United States backing into the
Colombia civil conflict under the pretext of fighting drugs?" Id.
175. Hearing on Narcotics Crisis in Colombia, Senate Government Reform committee, Sub-
committee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Feb. 15, 2000, available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, Hearing File (testimony of Rep. John Mica, Chairman) (report-
ing Bob Barr's Concerns).
176. 2000 Foreign Policy Overview, supra note 164 (testimony of Madeline K. Al-
bright. Secretary of State).
177. Dudley, supra note 166, at A13. Steven Dudley reports:
Since taking office, Pastrana has enjoyed clear support from the Clinton ad-
ministration even while his domestic approval ratings have tumbled. "U.S. aid
in and of itself cannot help Pastrana," said Alfredo Rangel, an adviser to for-
mer president Ernesto Samper. "The president needs to change the country's
expectations with regards to the economy and the peace talks."
Id.
178. Colombia To Make Safe Haven for Second Rebel Group, REuTERs, Feb. 17, 2000.
The Pastrana administration is now entering into negotiations to cede a large territory
to the ELN after an extensive campaign of "hijacking, mass kidnapping and sabotage"
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more positive spin on this, however, saying that the Colombian
president cannot be expected to garner tremendous support
during such a sensitive period in Colombia's history. 79
The Clinton administration's proposed US$1.6 billion pack-
age in military and humanitarian aid faltered in Congress last
October. A well-orchestrated media campaign and a blitz by
White House officials testifying before both chambers of Con-
gress, however, have brought the bill to the top of the current
legislative session's agenda. This funding would supplement the
support allocated for Colombia in the President's Fiscal Year
2000 budget. 8 ' The plan "involves approximately $300 million
in regular appropriations in the 2000 and 2001 budget, a $954
million emergency supplemental in fiscal year 2000, and $318
million of additional funds in fiscal year 2001,I ' sl8 and contains
five major components.
The first component is helping the Colombian Government
push into the coca-growing regions of southern Colombia, which
are now dominated by insurgent guerillas. Funds will help train
special counter-narcotics battalions, purchase thirty Blackhawk
and thirty-three Huey helicopters, and provide other support.
The second component is to upgrade Colombian capability to
interdict aggressively cocaine and cocaine traffickers. Funds will
be used for radar, aircraft and airfield upgrades, and improved
anti-narcotics intelligence gathering. The third component is
increasing coca crop eradication. The U.S. Administration will
propose US$96 million to purchase equipment that will enable
the Colombian National Police to eradicate more coca and
poppy fields. The fourth component will promote alternative
crops and jobs. The U.S. Administration will propose US$145
million over the next two years to provide economic alternatives
in February. However, because FARC-held territory, a "Switzerland-sized region in
Southeast Colombia," has become the center for drug smuggling and rebel justice,
"peasants had fiercely protested calls for an ELN safe haven in northern Bolivar prov-
ince. But the government struck a deal with the 10,000 protesters on Thursday, ending
a week-long blockade of main highways through the region."
179. Dudley, supra note 166, at A13. "U.S. aid in and of itself cannot help Pas-
trana." "The president needs to change the country's expectations with regards to the
economy and the peace talks." Id
180. The current budget proposal calls for US$150 million each year, US$954 mil-
lion in emergency aid for FY 2000, and an increase in FY 2001 of US$318 million. Id.
181. State Department Foreign Press Center Briefing Subject: Aid Package for Colombia,
FED. NEvs SERVICE, Jan. 11, 2000.
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for Colombian farmers who now grow coca and poppy plants.
The final component is increasing protection of human rights,
expanding the rule of law, and promoting the peace process.
The U.S. Administration will propose US$93 million for new
programs that will help the judicial system, and crack down on
money laundering.18 2
Both parties in Congress criticized the Clinton plan for be-
ing late to arrive when Congress was requesting the White House
to take action at least five years ago. 8 3 Furthermore, there ap-
pears to be little faith among Republican lawmakers that the
White House will improve its record of bungling the job of get-
ting material and training to the Colombians. The media has
not been hoodwinked either by the administration media cam-
paign, as the shadow of Vietnam still looms over the U.S. psyche.
One newspaper editorial pointed out the dangers of mixing mili-
tary aid with anti-narcotics assistance and accused the Clinton
administration of backing into a civil war without a clearly de-
fined agenda. 8 4
To make matters worse, the rebels in the field are pointing
out that U.S. military advisers are accompanying Colombia army
battalions everywhere they go. The parallel between such devel-
opments and the presence of U.S. trainers during the civil war in
El Salvador-or the one in Vietnam, for that matter-may not
be perfect, but it's true enough to give pause. Before embarking
182. The White House Fact Sheet-Colombia Assistance Package, M2 PRsswaRE, Jan. 12,
2000; see also State Department Foreign Press Center, supra note 181.
183. U.S. Representative John Mica (R-FL) held hearings on U.S. Policy for Co-
lombia. FDCH PoLmcA TRAsc~ivrs, Aug. 6, 1999. According to the statement by
Rep. Mica:
despite five years of congressional pleas for assistance to Colombia, countless
hearings and intense congressional effort, resources approved by Congress
have failed to be provided to Colombia .... Even since February the threat
has grown substantially. Events in country appear to be spiraling out of con-
trol. Colombia is now what military officials call situation critical .... Many of
us on the Hill saw this situation coming years ago as this administration repeat-
edly ignored the problem.
On the other side of the aisle, Edolphus Towns (D-NY), voiced some concerns by
the Democrats over the Clinton administration plan, noting "It is my understanding
that recently there have been calls for an additional $1 billion in assistance for Colom-
bia. However, given the dismal results we have seen for the money we have spent thus
far, I am not sure that more money is the answer to this question." Rep. Towns went on
to state, "It seems to me that additional military spending will only exacerbate the chaos
in Colombia."
184. White House Fact Shee, supra note 182.
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on an adventure with uncertain prospects, Mr. Clinton should
consider doing the following:
* Assume that his policy will be held accountable.
" Define the problem and clearly explain the U.S. national
interest in Colombia.
" State the role he envisions for the United States, along
with its cost and duration.
• Define his exit strategy.
* The president should remember that stability in Colom-
bia need not be a question for the United States alone. If
regional security interests are at stake, then other coun-
tries in the hemisphere must be invited to cooperate with
the United States in addressing the stability of northeast-
ern South America.1" 5
There is also concern over White House assurances that human
rights will be a top priority. Observers in both countries have
long assumed that the war on drugs serves as a justification for
human rights abuses against citizens settling scores, or inno-
cently caught between combatants in both the drug war and the
fifty year old guerrilla campaign in which the insurgents and
paramilitary forces, more than ever, are closely linked to drug
production and trafficking. In a conflict that has now spanned
half a century and claimed nearly 40,000 lives, "[h]uman rights
organizations and some Democratic U.S. lawmakers contend
that the aid package will fuel human rights abuses."'1 6
B. The Coverdell Proposal
Following high-level talks with President Pastrana in the
summer and fall of 1999, Senator Coverdell introduced sweep-
ing Republican legislation to the Senate in a preemptive move to
wrest control of response to plan Colombia away from the White
House. l8 7 The ALIANZA Act of 1999 would authorize US$1.6
billion over three years to achieve the following:
185. Id.
186. Kotler, supra note 169. "The small percentage of U.S. aid for humanitarian
programs has triggered criticism from national and international human rights groups
that the United States is doing little to care for a refugee problem that its military aid
helps create." Sibylla Brodzinsky, One of the Worst Human Rights Crises in the World, USA
TODAY, Feb. 3, 2000, at 10A.
187. A Muddle in the Jungle, EcONOMIST, Mar. 4,2000, at 17. "Aiding the Colombian
police has been adopted as a political cause by a group of congressional Republicans
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(1) to prescribe proactive measures to confront the threat to
U.S. interests of continued instability in Colombia;
(2) to defend constitutional order, the rule of law, and
human rights, which will benefit all persons;
(3) to support the democratically elected Government of the
Republic of Colombia to secure a firm and lasting end to
the armed conflict and lawlessness within its territory,
which now costs countless lives, threatens regional secur-
ity, and undermines effective anti-drug efforts;
(4) to require the President to design and implement an ur-
gent, comprehensive, and adequately funded plan of sup-
port for Colombia and its neighbors;
(5) to authorize adequate funds to implement an urgent and
comprehensive plan of economic development and anti-
drug support for Colombia and the front line states;
(6) to authorize indispensable material, technical, and logis-
tical support to enhance the effectiveness of anti-drug ef-
forts that are essential to impeding the flow of deadly co-
caine and heroin from Colombia to the United States;
and
(7) to bolster the capacity of the front line states to confront
the current destabilizing effects of the Colombia conflict
and to resist illicit narcotics trafficking activities that may
seek to elude enhanced law enforcement efforts in Co-
lombia.' 88
There are a number of notable provisions in the proposed
bill. One mandates that the President periodically submit a
comprehensive "report on the current United States policy and
strategy regarding United States counternarcotics assistance for
Colombia and the front line states" 18 9 to the appropriate con-
gressional committees and the Caucus on International Narcot-
ics Control of the Senate. Another provision contains a schedule
for implementing actions in order to meet such priorities. The
report also explains the U.S. role in the efforts of the Colombian
Government to deal with illegal drug production, domestic in-
surgency, and irregular forces in Colombia. Furthermore, it dis-
cusses how the strategy with respect to Colombia relates to the
who believe that one of the cheaper and more effective ways to deal with the United
States' addiction to drugs is to stop their production at source." Id.
188. See ALIANZA, supra note 165, § 2.
189. Id. § 102(a). The front line states are Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru,
and Venezuela. Id. § 4(2).
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U.S. strategy for the front line states, and how the strategy with
respect to Colombia relates to the U.S. strategy for fulfilling
global counternarcotics goals. The report also provides a strat-
egy and schedule for providing urgent material, technical, and
logistical support to Colombia and the front line states in order
to defend the rule of law and to impede more effectively the
cultivation, production, transit, and sale of illicit narcotics. This
last requirement would certainly address past criticisms that the
White House has been negligent in responding quickly to logisti-
cal issues in getting materials to Colombia for deployment. 190
ALIANZA places the issue of guerrilla insurgency and
paramilitary lawlessness squarely on the table, and acknowledges
that dealing with the drug trade is tantamount to dealing with
the guerrillas and paramilitaries.19 ' This provision raises a
number of questions regarding the degree to which the United
States may be willing to involve itself in the guerrilla conflict. In
ALIANZA's findings, it is noted that
The FARC and the ELN engage in systematic extortion
through the abduction of United States citizens, have mur-
dered United States citizens, profit from the illegal drug
trade, and engage in systematic and indiscriminate crimes, in-
cluding kidnapping, torture, and murder, against Colombian
civilian and security forces. 192
ALIANZA also noted that "[t]he FARC and the ELN have
targeted United States Government personnel, private United
States citizens, and United States business interests." 9 3 Further-
more, "[i]n March 1999, the FARC murdered three kidnapped
United States human rights workers near the international bor-
der between Colombia and Venezuela.'
'1 4
ALIANZA also acknowledges the complex interrelationship
between the irregular forces (guerrillas and paramilitaries) and
190. Representative Mica Holds Hearings on U.S. Policy for Colombia, FDCH PoLmCAL
TRANscRiars, Aug. 6, 1999. Rep. Mica reported that, "We're still, this administration has
resisted congressional effort to ensure that needed drug fighting equipment makes it-
makes its way to Colombia in a timely manner." Id.
191. ALIANZA, supra note 165, § 3(1). The armed conflict and resulting lawless-
ness in Colombia present a clear and present danger to the security of the front line
states, to law enforcement efforts intended to impede the flow of cocaine and heroin,
and, therefore, to the well-being of the people of the United States.
192. Id § 3(7).
193. Id. § 3(8).
194. Id. § 3(9).
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the drug trade, noting that "the FARC has plotted to use
$3,000,000 in funds earned from drug trafficking to buy 30,000
AK-47s."'I9 Given that irregular forces control nearly forty per-
cent of Colombian territory, ALIANZA states,
It is the sense of Congress that the effectiveness of United
States anti-drug assistance to Colombia depends on the ability
of law enforcement officials of that country having unim-
peded access to all areas of the national territory of Colombia
for the purposes of carrying out the interdiction of illegal nar-
cotics and the eradication of illicit crops.'
96
Does this imply that the aid package will be used to conduct
military operations against the guerrillas to gain access to guer-
rilla held territory where the majority of coca and heroin pro-
duction is taking place?' 97 Furthermore, ALIANZA urges that
members of irregular forces involved in drug trafficking should
be brought to justice. One might wonder how such individuals
are going to be brought to justice without military operations
being conducted in order to facilitate apprehension. The insur-
gency and paramilitary conflict has resulted in untold human
rights abuses by all combatants.'98 ALLANZA addresses human
195. Id. § 3(11).
196. Id. § 105.
197. The department of Putumayo, located in the southern part of Colombia, is
perhaps the most strategically important area to guerrilla insurgents and drug traffick-
ers. Putumayo is largely under FARC control, and the majority of Colombia's coca and
heroine production occurs in Putumayo. If Plan Colombia and U.S. assistance targets
drug production in Putumayo, then it will be impossible to carry out drug interdictions
programs without conducting military operations against the guerrillas in the region.
For a detailed explanation see Putumayo-The Stategic South, Special Report,
Acutalidad Colombiana, (visited May 5, 2000) <http://www.actcol.f2s.com/engdoc/pu-
tumayo99.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
198. Human Rights Watch and other human rights groups have long documented
human rights violations in Colombia. The department of Putumayo isjust one example
of nationwide human rights abuses. Many of these violent deaths have been attributed
to paramilitary groups that operate freely throughout the department, although the
FARC are also responsible for some of them. In March 1998, the FARC killed seven
people in the municipality of Valle Del Guams (La Hormiga) accusing them of collab-
orating with the paramilitaries. In mid May of the same year a group of 400 peasant
farmers peacefully occupied the headquarters of the Defensorfa del Pueblo (Human
Rights Ombudsman's Office) demanding ajudicial investigation against these groups.
No captures, however, were reported of any of them. Four months earlier the mayor of
Puerto Asis at that time made declarations regarding the transport of paramilitaries in
military helicopters, death threats and murders carried out by these groups, but he later
retracted these declarations.
After working groups were held in the context of a "Common Front Against the
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rights concerns and provides that aid be linked with the Colom-
bian government's efforts to confront its human rights record,
and authorizes the President to support efforts by the Attorney
General of Colombia "to investigate and prosecute members of
Colombian irregular forces involved in gross violations of inter-
nationally recognized human rights," and "to investigate and
prosecute members of Colombian security forces involved in
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."'
Perhaps the most transparent aspect of the U.S. aid be-
comes evident in ALIANZA, for while drug trafficking represents
"a clear and present danger" to the United States, the instability
of Colombia also hinders economic development and foreign in-
vestment. Under Section 101 of ALIANZA regarding support
for democracy, peace, the rule of law, and human rights in Co-
lombia, the U.S. policy will be "to insist that the Government of
Colombia complete urgent reforn measures intended to open
its economy fully to foreign investment and commerce, particu-
larly in the petroleum industry, as a path toward economic re-
covery and self-sufficiency." 2°° Considering the rich oil and coal
deposits located in regions under guerrilla control (or hotly con-
tested between the government and irregular forces), it stands to
reason that if Colombia cannot rid itself of guerrillas and
paramilitaries, then it cannot get rid of drug trafficking. There-
fore, oil corporations and other foreign investors cannot enter
Colombia and exploit the nation's natural resources.20 '
Violence" in Puerto Asis, the government promised to investigate the crimes. On June
8, a group of peasant farmers "Putumayenses por la Vda" (People of Putumaya for Life)
reached an agreement with the Samper Government on the investigation of human
rights violations. These agreements, however, have not been kept by the new govern-
ment of Andrfs Pastrana. In September, the FARC assassinated the parish priest of
Puerto Caicedo. His attempt to seek neutrality in the conflict was not forgiven by the
alleged militia that cut short his life and 18 years of work in the community.
On January 9, 1999, a group of approximately 50 paramilitaries of the AUG killed
about 40 people in the village of El Tigre (municipality of Valle del Guamfis-La
Hormiga), although the authorities only reported 23 cases; all the dead were accused of
being members of the FARG. Official complaints were made in November of this year
(Actualidad Colombiana 276) when around 13 people were killed in various municipal-
ities for being alleged paramilitaries. See Human Rights Violations, Putumayo-The
Stategic South, Special Report, Acutalidad Colombiana, (visited May 5, 2000) <http://
vv.actcol.f2s.com/engdoc/putumayo99.html> (on Fordham International Law Journal).
199. ALIANZA, supra note 165, § 203(a) (3)-(4).
200. Id. § 101.
201. For a detailed explanation on how the oil and mineral industry has been
impacted by the guerrilla war and drug trafficking, see The Petroleum Business, Putu-
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In addition to supplying training and material for law en-
forcement and the military to conduct counternarcotics opera-
dons, the ALLANZA would fund programs to strengthen the ju-
diciary. 2  Under Section 201, the President would be author-
ized
to enhance the rule of law through training of judges, prose-
cutors, and other judicial officials and through a witness pro-
tection program; to improve police investigative training and
facilities and related civilian police activities; and to
strengthen a credible military justice system, including techni-
cal support by the United States Judge Advocate General, and
strengthen existing human rights monitors within the ranks
of the military.2
03
Both plans share similar goals: to wrestle control of drug
trafficking from narco-guerrillas, install law and order, provide
economic programs to ease Colombian peasants away from reli-
ance on coca as a subsistence crop, assist those displaced by the
drug war and the guerrilla war, and stabilize Colombian territory
for foreign investment. But the two approaches are really in
conflict. The White House proposal insists that counternarcotics
operations can be accomplished without interfering in the guer-
rilla conflict and that aid will not go to fighting guerrillas. The
Republican position seems more realistic and acknowledges the
link between narcotics and the irregular forces. The differences
between the two aid proposals demonstrate the United States'
lack of clarity over the issues at work in Colombia. Accordingly,
a brief examination of the potential downside to U.S. involve-
ment is warranted.
C. Drawbacks for the United States
With the FARC in control of nearly forty percent of Colom-
bia, guerrillas and drug trafficking cannot be separated by mere
policy musings in Washington. Like it or not, the United States
is threading an increasingly narrowing path between fighting the
drug war and directly involving itself in another country's civil
war. Inevitably, concerns over human rights cannot be ad-
mayo-The Stategic South, Special Report, Acutalidad Colombiana, (visited May 5,
2000) <http://www.actcol.f2s.com/engdoc/putumayo99.html> (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal).
202. ALIANZA, supra note 165, § 201.
203. Id. § 201(a) (4)-(6).
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dressed no matter what provisions or conditions accompany the
aid packages to Colombia. For instance, the provision in the
Foreign Assistance Operations Act of FY2000 that states that only
individuals who have been "vetted"2 4 (cleared of committing
human rights abuses) can serve in counternarcotics units are
problematic. There is simply no reliable way to monitor the situ-
ation on the ground, and while there may be officials in the mili-
tary who have clear records and can be enlisted to help monitor
human rights compliance, one can be fairly certain that some-
one above or below the chain of command in which those
"cleared" individuals fall is linked to human rights abuses. The
situation basically constitutes a political shell game in which bil-
lions of dollars are at stake.
For all of President Clinton's statesmanship and Secretary
Albright's claims 2 5 that the Colombian government promises to
be vigilant against human rights abuses, history proves that
human rights abuses have occurred in the past under U.S. pro-
grams and will in all likelihood continue. 2 6 The realities of Co-
lombia, whether they be the continuing forced displacement of
refugees from zones of military and counternarcotics operations,
or vendettas to be settled between combatants, dictate that
human rights abuses are an ingrained component of the polit-
ical, societal, legal, and economic elements of Colombia.
III. THE REAL COLOMBIA
Centuries of institutionalized corruption, five decades of
guerrilla insurrection, a quarter century of uncontrollable drug
trafficking and narcoterrorism, and horrific political and societal
violence have brought Colombia to the precipice of anarchy and
disintegration. The Pastrana administration is all but paralyzed
by domestic crisis after crisis and can do little but react to events
204. Leahy Amendment, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 564 (1999).
205. 2000 Foreign Policy Ovenriew, supra note 164 (testimony of Madeleine K Al-
bright, Secretary of State). Albright stated:
As I made clear to President Pastrana when I visited Cartagena last month, our
support for Plan Colombia rests on the Colombian government's commitment
to continue to take appropriate action against human rights violators whether
those violators are military, paramilitary, guerrilla or just plain criminals.
Under President Pastrana's leadership, there has already been solid progress
on this issue, but more remains to be done.
Id.
206. See Nagle, supra note 42.
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as they unfold, making any goals of formulating and initiating
long term domestic policies and programs overly optimistic.
The legitimate government for all intents and purposes is not in
control and is largely out of touch with the will of the Colombian
people. One contact within the Pastrana administration pointed
out that the day is spent putting out one fire after another, and
that officials feel fortunate it they can correctly anticipate what
will happen two or three hours into the future. Given this polit-
ical climate of reacting to events rather than maintaining a
proactive and pre-emptive control, it seems inconceivable that
Plan Colombia can succeed under the present circumstances.
Secretary Albright stated, "[t] he struggle in Colombia is not
between left and right, rich and poor, or between one ethnic
group and another. It's between those who want to pursue pros-
perity and social development democratically and those addicted
to criminality, violence and corruption."2 7 Unfortunately, Sec-
retary Albright is mistaken. In Colombia, the lines are too
blurred. Nothing in Colombia is as it seems and nothing can be
viewed in black and white; only in shadows of gray. Those indi-
viduals committed to democratic development are also involved
in corruption."' Those depicted as criminals are seen as heroes
to some sectors of the society. Those who were once Marxist
revolutionaries are now confirmed narco-capitalists. 219 Military
207. Albright Says U.S. not Being Sucked into Colombian War, WHITE HOUSE BULL =N,
Jan. 18, 2000.
208. Most of the great reformers and honest public servants have fallen to assas-
sins' bullets. The few remaining pass through each day as marked individuals, living
under virtual house arrest with prices on their heads and constant threats of extortion
and kidnapping.
209. Ana Carrigan, Long-Awaited Breakthrough in Colombian Talks Rebel Leaders Are
Working with a Government Delegation on an Economic Blueprint, IRISH TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2000,
at 11. According to Carrigan,
FARG has stepped away from orthodox Marxist ideology in pursuit of some-
thing that can only be called "socialism a la Colombiana" and the two sides in
the talks have set themselves a six-month deadline for coming up with an ac-
ceptable new economic model to "create jobs, distribute income, permit eco-
nomic growth and social development.
See also John Otis, Colombia Rebel Leaders on Tour of Scandinavia, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 3,
2000, at A15. Otis notes that the FARC, "which has 17,000 fighters, is heavily involved
in the narcotics trade and has been blacklisted by the State Department as a 'terrorist'
group."
During senate hearings last year, it was acknowledged that the FARC is inextricably
involved in drug trafficking. Assistant Secretary of State Beers, testified that "our au-
thorization and our strategy is counternarcotics. It will also effectively reduce the capa-
bilities of the insurgents. It is their life blood." Senator Sheridan affirmed that, "In the
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and police officers by day are paramilitary terrorists by night.
Former army conscripts unable to find jobs have become guerril-
las fighting their old comrades. Serving military and national
police personnel supplement their meager pay by selling their
weapons and supplies to the irregular forces. Many Colombians
driven toward prosperity at any cost are perhaps the most to
blame for the Colombian crisis, and the old oligarchy continue
to go through life with their heads in the sand-their biggest
concerns being the dinner menu at the country club and meet-
ing their next extortion payout.
2 1 0
Into this landscape of abnormality, the United States is try-
ing to apply a rational, thoughtful, and balanced solution to a
country that is everything but rational and balanced. For this
reason if for no other, the US$1.6 billion proposal by the Clin-
ton administration, the US$1.6 billion ALIANZA bill, and Plan
Colombia are all fatally flawed by historical precedent. Imple-
mentation of any of these plans will accomplish little other than
to throw good money after bad. At the very least, the proposals
to fund Plan Colombia demonstrate the U.S. government's seri-
ous lack of clarity in understanding the real Colombian crisis.
Colombians point their fingers at the United States as the
reason for Colombia's problems with narcotrafficking and
narcoterrorism. According to one historian, Colombians believe
the cocaine business will continue 'Just as long as the United
States remained addicted; so why should they meanwhile be get-
ting killed in trying to stop it?" 21 ' Yet, the truth is that the
United States and other consumer nations are not wholly re-
sponsible for Colombia's drug and insurgency problems. Co-
lombia's problems are of its own doing, the result of the elite
ignoring the needs of less fortunate fellow countrymen for too
long, and quietly condoning the illegal drug trade because
narcodollars pour into the formal economy and enrich the elite
far beyond the economic models that represent a developing
course of them doing counternarcotics work, they will end up denying the FARC the
revenue that the FARC need to engage in their insurgency." Colombia: Counterin-
surgenq vs. Counterzarcotics, Senate Caucus, Washington, D.C., FDCH PoLrnCAL TPAN-
sciPTS, Sept. 21, 1999.
210. See Frank Bajak, Colombian Rebels Harass Businessmen, AP ONLINE, Oct. 31,
1999.
211. DAVID BusHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN COLOMBIA: A NATION IN SPITE OF
ITSELF 267 (Univ. of California Press, 1993).
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country's progress. The elite became intoxicated with the outra-
geous extravagance and largess of the drug lords. The money
was too much, too quick, and too easy. Meanwhile, the guerrillas
were conveniently shunted aside as leftist rabble, easily con-
trolled and subdued by private armies fighting the clandestine,
ugly turf wars of the landed elite. It was reasoned that if they
were ignored they would go away. But fifty years later they are
still rampaging across the countryside, living successfully on the
ingredients of guerrilla economics-kidnapping, extortion, rob-
bery, displacement, terror, and now drug running-a narco-mili-
taristic society preying on a frayed civilian society. Given such a
situation, how can the U.S. Administration seriously think a few
billion more dollars and a few thousand more weapons will make
a positive difference?
Plan Colombia requires US$7 billion, with nearly half of it
coming from foreign governments. Why should foreign govern-
ments bail Colombia out for its own incompetence and toler-
ance for institutional corruption? Did the United States not
learn its lesson with Salinas de Gotari and the Mexican
bailout?212 Like Mexico, the Pastrana government wants the
world community to help Colombia out of its crisis. But what
about all the Colombians who have bled their country dry for
years through corruption and white-collar criminality? Before
President Pastrana can legitimately solicit the world community
for help in combating Colombia's many political and social di-
sasters, his administration should go after the Colombian ex-pa-
triots who have defrauded, bilked, bankrupted, and absconded
with billions of dollars from Colombian businesses and govern-
ment-connected institutions-Colombians are currently living
like royalty in Florida, Mexico, Spain, and elsewhere in the West-
ern Hemisphere. They have contributed as much as any drug
lord or guerrilla to bringing their country to the point of its de-
struction because for decades their sole purpose was to rape the
country of national resources and deny other fellow citizens
their birthrights. They should be the ones made to pay for fix-
ing the problem. They should be the ones paying for a Plan
Colombia. Holding its own citizens accountable would be a
212. Tony Avergan, Mexican Government Payback Bad News for Mexicans (last modi-
fiedJan. 15, 1997) <http://www.igc.org/dgap/NewMex.html> (on file with the Fordham
International LawJournal).
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form of mutual assistance by which the Colombian government
would be demonstrating a strong commitment to its partner-
ships with other nations coming to Colombia's rescue.
There is compelling evidence, however, that mutual assist-
ance is not necessarily mutual,2 1 3 and some Congressional
lawmakers are skeptical about the Clinton administration's abil-
ity to put together a successful assistance package.
Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, said any such aid should not be
just "another long list of goodies without thought as to pur-
pose and result." Grassley said he would introduce legislation
to require the administration to develop a detailed strategy
on Colombia within the next six months. "It is embarrassing
that we have so little before the Congress or the American
public by way of serious policy or honest discussion on what
we are to do."
214
The notion of mutual assistance challenges one's imagina-
tion as to how the United States or other foreign benefactors can
ever see an exceptional return on its assistance-unless of course
one considers the link between mutual assistance and the inter-
ests of foreign investors in Colombia such as oil and mining cor-
porations and high tech manufacturers. Granted, the assets
seized under the Customs Service Agreement have been substan-
tial, but represent merely the tip of the iceberg.
The Clinton administration and many members of Congress
believe the Colombian government is earnest and ready to tow
the line on mutual assistance in exchange for massive military
213. Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics, and Terrorism Drug Certification, Feb. 26, 1998, available
in LEXIS, Legis Library, Hearing File (testimony of Thomas A. Constantine, DEA Ad-
ministrator). In his prepared statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, Constantine stated:
The corruption, the political environment in Colombia continues to hinder
United States counter-drug efforts. There are divergent anti-drug agendas
within the government, a frail and very weak judicial system, widespread offi-
cial corruption and a weak national resolve to confront this problem to limit
Colombia's ability cooperation in the anti-drug arena.
Id. Elsewhere in the region, relations with Mexico in the drug war were strained in
1999 after the United States sent 73 helicopters to Mexico that were too old to be
operational. Mexico returned the helicopters. Drug dealers also were able to evade
arrest during Operation Millenium, due in part to corruption within Mexico's law en-
forcement network. See U.S. Anti-Drug Czar To Assess Mexico's Anti-Drug Efforts, AGENCE
FRANCE PRussE, Feb. 8, 2000.
214. David Briscoe, World Bank Vows Support for Pastrana (Sept. 22, 1999) <http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/19990922/aponlinel85 726 -OOO.htm>.
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and economic support. Yet, incidents continue to occur that
prompt reasonable observers to wonder if Colombia is capable
of satisfying such lofty expectations when it appears more as if
the government is merely reshuffling the same old cards and
gambling on being able to continue milking the cash cow like it
always has. Some of the incidents border on absurd, such as the
escape over the Christmas holidays of a jailed leading com-
mander of the FARC who was released on a weekend furlough
for Christmas and didn't return to prison when he was supposed
to report back.215 How can the Colombian government be taken
seriously about prosecuting both the drug war and the guerrilla
war if such errors in judgment occur? What kind of message
does an incident like this send to the world about Colombia's
resolve to fight the drug war or end the insurgency? What will
become of those captured in counternarcotics operations paid
for by the United States? How many of them will return to jail
after their weekend furloughs?
In February, prisoners staged a nationwide prison takeover
simultaneously around the country. The event was carefully
orchestrated and synchronized via the cellular telephones pris-
oners are allowed to keep. They went so far as to call their wives
and girlfriends on the phones to instruct them to come to the
prisons with their children. The women in turn used their chil-
dren as human shields to gain access to the their husbands and
lovers injail.216 How can the United States ignore such incidents
and still be willing to commit law enforcement and military re-
215. Radio Cadena Nacional (visited Jan. 7, 2000) <http://www.rcn.com.co> (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal). According to a report on Colombian
radio,
[L]ocal prison officials reported that the commander of a FARC column failed
to return to his prison cell in Neiva (Huila) after he was awarded a leave per-
mit for good conduct in prison in order to spend the holidays with his family.
The rebel fugitive, whose name is Cenon Martinez Sanchez, was serving a
prison sentence of four years. At the time of his arrest, he was the financial
manager of a FARC faction. Martinez was confined to a prison in Neiva after
he was convicted for rebellion and illegal possession of weapons. He was
awarded a leave permit for good conduct so that he could spend the Christ-
mas holidays with his family. He never returned to prison and has been de-
clared a fugitive, the officials added. Martinez was the head of finance for a
FARC column known as the "Otelo Losada", which operates in southern Co-
lombia. The army arrested him in September 1998.
Id.; see also Police Say They Have Arrested Second in Command of FARC Front BBC SUMMARY
OF WoRLD BRoADcASrs, Jan. 10, 2000, Part 5.
216. Jared Kotler, In Colombia's Jails, Escapes Frequent as Prisoners Hold Sway, Associ-
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sources to Colombia when Colombia's law enforcement infra-
structure is incapable of living up to reasonable expectations re-
garding crime and punishment? U.S. policymakers need to
wake up and smell the Colombian coffee.
More troubling still are reports, acknowledged by my con-
tacts at the highest levels of government, that President Pastrana
negotiated with the FARC to gain the presidency. Heading into
the election, the Liberal candidate Horatio Serpa Uribe, was fa-
vored to win the Presidency. According to my sources, who
asked to be anonymous, the FARC threatened to kill any citizens
in the areas under FARC control if they went to the polls. In
exchange for the FARC suppressing the vote, candidate Pastrana
purportedly agreed to leave the FARC alone while going after
other guerrilla groups like the ELN (essentially assisting the
FARC in getting rid of the competition). If this is true, and
given that the FARC controls most of southern Colombia where
the majority of coca is grown, then one must wonder if the coun-
ternarcotics push into the region under Plan Colombia will actu-
ally occur as intended. One must also wonder if mutual assist-
ance will be implemented as intended. More likely, a dog and
pony show will ensue, coca will be seized, and crops eradicated.
But it will be interesting to see if and how many major players
will be arrested and convicted in the process.
ATED PRESS, May 2, 1999. According to Jared Kotler, the prisoners are in control in
Colombia's jails:
Recent disgraces at the prisons have bolstered those concerns:
" Last May, more than 300 prisoners, many of them guerrillas, escaped from a
western Colombian jail when comrades on the outside attacked the prison.
" In November, a hit man posing as a lawyer walked into a maximum security
prison and fatally shot Helmer "Pacho" Herrera, former No. 3 leader of the
Call drug cartel, while Herrera watched ajailyard soccer game.
" On NewYears Eve, the leader of a fringe leftist rebel group who ordered the
1996 kidnapping of a brother of former President Cesar Gaviria escaped
from a maximum security prison in Bogota. Police said he was smuggled out
in garbage bags, and 17 officers were fired for negligence.
" In March, 29 convicted or accused murderers tunneled their way out of the
Villahermosa federal prison in Cali, fleeing through sewers. The prison
wasn't aware of the escape until local residents called to report a group of
grimy men swarming out of a sewer grate....
" Fueling an explosive human cocktail are corrupt, unionized prison guards,
who earn the equivalent of about $250 a month while some inmates are
millionaires. For a price, many guards look the other way as drugs, liquor,
prostitutes, guns and cellular telephones flow freely into the most "high-
security" jails.
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One of the most inexplicable moves by the Colombian gov-
ernment occurred in February 2000 when it issued passports to
FARC guerrillas for them to embark on a diplomatic tour of Eu-
rope, despite the fact that their comrades, in arms, continue to
butcher civilians and soldiers indiscriminately. 17 The tour,218
comprised of both Colombian government negotiators and their
FARC counterparts, traveled to the European governments that
the Pastrana administration has approached for financial and
economic assistance in implementing Plan Colombia. Accord-
ing to Colombian foreign minister Guillermo Fernandez, "the
objective of the 10-day joint government-FARC mission in Eu-
rope is 'to gather experiences related to economic and social
development issues that can be applied in Colombia.' 219 Con-
sidering there are no guerrillas, uncontrolled narco-economies,
or vast drug production and trafficking in Norway and France,
one wonders what these countries have in common with Colom-
bia that FARC guerrillas would relate. What is more, ELN lead-
ers are allowed to travel outside Colombia as well, begging the
question of how such individuals can travel with impunity in the
first place.
Pablo Beltran, a senior ELN commander, told reporters on a
visit to Nicaragua [that] government security forces would
also be removed from the zone the ELN is to be granted con-
trol over in Bolivar. "The only military force that will be left
217. Yadira Ferrer, Politics-Colombia: Peace Negotiators Seek Ideas in Eurqpe, INTR
PRmSS SERV., Feb. 3, 2000. Both sides also affirmed in ajoint declaration that they would
discuss, beginning Feb. 20, an economic model that takes into account "the globalized
world," leaving aside radical positions of"savage capitalism" and socialist extremism. Id.
218. Hearing of the Senate International Relations Committee: Fiscal Year 2001 State De-
partment Foreign Affairs Budge Feb. 16, 2000, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Hearing
File (testimony of Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State). On this tour, Secretary
Albright stated during a hearing before the House International Relations Committee
on February 16, 2000:
I have also found quite remarkable the FARC trip around Europe, and very
encouraging, because this is kind of a sign, first of all, that there is a way peo-
ple can be brought together to talk about this, but for another reason: be-
cause there had been a sense-at least this is what I learned earlier-is that
the FARC did not want any kind of international involvement in all of this, and
I think this shows that the international community can, in fact, help.
Id. It is astounding that Secretary Albright can sound so magnanimous toward the
FARC, which is guilty of the abduction and murder of three U.S. citizens, and controls a
huge percentage of drug production and trafficking. Id.
219. Ferrer, supra note 217.
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there is that of the guerrillas," Beltran said. 2 °
In the mean time, however, the Colombian police and military
forces continue to hunt down guerrillas, and the guerrillas con-
tinue military and criminal operations without respite.
2 21
To borrow an expression from President Bush, the guerril-
las have portrayed themselves as "kinder and gentler" partici-
pants in Colombia's domestic affairs. As a means of getting the
word out, guerrillas have their own web page222 and a team of
publicists. Skilled handlers shepherd a steady stream of foreign
journalists through a carefully orchestrated day in the life of the
FARC, feeding a steady diet of propaganda and misinformation
to the world community.
The press was even on hand when the ELN guerrillas closed
and held the main highway between Santa Fe de Bogotd and
Medellin for four days.223 Four days holding the most important
transportation artery in the country! Where was the military all
that time and why was it unable to react quickly to retake the
highway? This is despite the fact that U.S. military advisers have
been in the country training Colombian special forces for pre-
cisely such occasions. Meanwhile, atrocities continue by guerril-
las against resistant civilians and by paramilitaries against civil-
ians thought to be sympathetic to guerrillas, as well as civilians
innocently caught in the middle.
The issue of human rights remains one of the most difficult
challenges facing cooperation between the United States and
Colombia and would comprise the topic for its own paper. The
issues of displaced persons, however, does not seem to be ad-
dressed satisfactorily in either U.S. assistance plan.
The flood of internal refugees out of contested areas is not
adequately addressed in the foreign aid package. In what the
U.S. Committee for Refugees has called "one of the worst
220. Coonibia Political wolence Leaves 27 Dead REtrraas, Feb. 18, 2000.
221. Around January 7 of this year, police arrested Orlando Torres, second in
command of the FARC. One can only wonder how this can be reconciled with the
government's peace efforts.
222. See FARG-EP (visited Apr. 13, 2000) <http://burn.ucsd.edu/-farc-ep/> (on
file with the Fordham Intenational LawJournao; Resistencia (visited Apr. 13, 2000) <http:/
/ivw.contrast.org/mirrors/farc/ingles.hma> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
223. The ELN carried out similar disruptions of important highways throughout
the country. See ELN Rebels Continue "forced strike" "combat operations," BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 13, 2000, Part 5.
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human rights crises in the world," a daily average of 680
Colombians are fleeing their homes and heading into the
shantytowns of Colombia's beleaguered cities. 2 2 4
Likewise, Plan Colombia is vague in details as to how the
flood of unskilled refugees into the urban areas where infra-
structure is already stretched beyond the limits can be reversed.
Furthermore, capital flight and brain drain out of Colombia by
the skilled and wealthy classes are problems. How will Colombia
turn around its economy if the citizens most necessary for facing
its challenges ahead are nowhere to be found?
CONCLUSION
For more than a century the United States has been the
good neighbor (euphemistically speaking) to Latin America,225
involved and often interfering in the internal affairs of govern-
ments in the region in order to promote its own interests in the
hemisphere. 226 The U.S. policy has always been patriarchal in
intent, heavily laden with the notion of knowing what was best
for its southern neighbors and what it would take to lead Latin
America down the primrose path to true democracy and pros-
perity. Unfortunately, the matter of drugs and the insatiable ap-
petite of U.S. citizens for them caused successive U.S. administra-
tions to develop and implement largely unsuccessful-and at
times catastrophic-antinarcotics policies. Instead of being the
sometimes benevolent patriarch or sometimes malevolent des-
224. Kotler, supra note 169.
225. For in-depth examinations of the United States' good neighbor policies, see
DAVID GREEN, THE CONTAINMENT OF LATIN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE MYTHS AND RE.
ALITIES OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY (1971); GEORGE BLACK, THE GOOD NEIGHBOR:
How THE UNITED STATES WROTE THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
(1988).
226. Examples would include the military occupation of Nicaragua from 1911-
1933. See History (visited Apr. 13, 2000) <http://library.thinkquesLorg/17749/mainhis-
tory.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). In 1928, there was a
massacre of striking plantation workers in Aracataca in northern Colombia by hired
guns of the United Fruit Company. See WILLAM RAMiREz TOB6N, URUBA: Los IN-
CIERTOS CONFINES DE UNA CRISIS (1997); the occupation of Haiti from 1914-1934. See
Zoltan Grossman, Over a Century of U.S. Military Interventions (last modifiedJan. 1, 1995)
<http://eserver.org/govt/us-interventions.txt> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal); the occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916-1924 and again in
1965. Grossman, supra.; CIA involvement in bringing General Augusto Pinochet to
power in Chile in 1973; Id.; and backing dubious regimes in Guatemala and Honduras
during the 1980s. Id.
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pot, the United States found itself reeling from the unstoppable
onslaught of drugs across its porous borders.
Colombia, the United States' oldest ally in the region, is des-
perate and in disarray. The government remains crippled by
corruption and ineffectiveness, and there is little evidence that
much has changed under Pastrana's watch. Colombians distrust
their government as much as they despise the guerrillas. The
country is morally bankrupt. The guerrillas are in control of
nearly half the country and their operations are moving across
borders into neighboring countries, threatening to further
destabilize the entire region. There is also little reason to be-
lieve mutual assistance has succeeded as advertised in fighting
the drug war, for dealing with drug traffickers is similar to pour-
ing water on a grease fire. As soon as one cartel is stopped, doz-
ens spring up to take its place.
The United States wants to help Colombia, but has neither a
clear understanding of the problem nor the cohesive political
will to become involved in another Vietnam. The guerrillas have
reinvented themselves in recent years through a media blitz of
good old-fashioned salesmanship. Yet, their true colors have
been shown for what they are-thieving bandits greedy for
power and money. This is evident in their well-documented il-
licit activities that have placed guerrilla leaders among the
wealthiest of Colombians: extortion, kidnapping, robbery, arms
smuggling, security services for drug trafficking, and carrying on
their own drug production and trafficking operations.
The fact is, foreign mutual assistance comes down to money,
how much can be gotten of it, who can supply the most of it, and
who gets to keep it. For the guerrillas, foreign assistance has
come in the form of profits from drug trafficking and now is
moving toward economic and socialization support from Euro-
pean nations. The lines between legitimacy and criminality are
growing more blurred. For the Colombian government, military
and economic aid is a matter of survival. If getting that aid re-
quires throwing some bones to the United States in the spirit of
mutual cooperation, then so be it. But Colombia's power bro-
kers and an army of corrupt officials are simply too good at what
they do, and there is little possibility that the United States can
actually hold Colombia accountable for events within its borders.
Colombia's human rights record is a case in point. In spite
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of restrictions written into mutual assistance agreements past
and present, most members of the armed forces evade prosecu-
tion and conviction because the military courts maintain jurisdic-
tion over the military's own affairs. 2 27 Non-military combatants
accused of human rights atrocities have been able to escapejus-
tice by intimidating the courts through harassment, bribery, and
murder.22 ' There is simply no way the United States can control
the manner in which Colombia upholds its side of the coopera-
tion equation. Furthermore, the ineptitude displayed by the
Clinton administration in dealing with the Colombian crisis also
raises questions as to the administration's commitment and abil-
ity to hold up its side of mutual assistance agreements and aid
packages.
Why then are the foreign governments signing on to Plan
Colombia without asking the hard questions? Possibly, the risks
are worth the rewards. For every dollar invested in Plan Colom-
bia, foreign corporations stand to gain many dollars in return
for access to Colombia's precious natural resources and market
prospects. Again, it all comes down to money. If the guerrillas
do eventually end up in permanent control of large tracts of Co-
lombian territory, then their pseudo-Marxist mantras will no
longer work for them. Their only hope for remaining in control
will be to deal with foreign corporations that want to do business
in their regions. Between drug trafficking and foreign invest-
ment, the guerrillas stand to gain billions of dollars with little or
no responsibility to the central democratic government. On the
other hand, if the legitimate government wants to stay in power,
concessions must be made to foreign investment, regardless of
what Colombia's citizens might want.
There are no easy answers to Colombia's crisis, and mutual
assistance is not the magic bullet. This has been proven over
and over again over the course of many years. The things that
the Colombian government is asking now are the same things
227. See Nagle, supra note 42, § V.
228. Representative Mica Holds Hearings on U.S. Policy for Colombia, FDCH PoLrrCA
TRANscRimPTS, Aug. 6, 1999. Rep. Towns stated, "The State Department and numerous
human rights groups have reported that para military groups aligned with the army of
Colombia murder and kill civilians because of their political beliefs." For an excep-
tional analysis of non-military combatants in Colombia, see CARLOS MEDNA GALLEGO,
AUTODEFENSAS, PARAMILTARES Y NARcOTRAFiCO EN COLOMBIA: EL CASO PUERTO BOYACA
338 (1990); see also PEARCE, supra note 7.
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the Colombians asked for ten years ago and twenty years ago.
Colombia cannot be dealt with in a rational manner under inter-
nationally recognized conducts of behavior because there is
nothing rational about Colombia. The society and its institu-
tions are just too dysfunctional.
Mutual assistance serves many purposes, not the least of
which are in the interests of the military industrial complex, an
army of human rights and economic development consultants
and groups, and multinational corporations anxious to exploit
Colombia's vast resources and highly skilled labor force. There
is little if any altruism or new-world-order sincerity involved here.
Mutual assistance means money and power for whoever can grab
it, and if along'the way the lives of combatants are lost and
thousands of innocent people are displaced and caught in cross-
fires, so it goes. As long as fortunes are made for stockholders or
corrupt actors in the drama, the same vicious cycle of horror and
irrationality will continue over and over until there is nothing
left but rotting carcasses and vast uninhabitable wastelands.
Furthermore, Colombia does not need more weapons flow-
ing into the country. Colombia is already armed to the teeth.
Adding more sophisticated means of killing each other and reek-
ing environmental disaster on one of the world's most precious
ecosystems is wrong,229 and no matter what the U.S. national se-
curity concerns are, arming and provisioning the Colombian
military and propping up an uncertain civilian administration is
not the answer. This is true especially when the law enforcement
authorities are incapable of "providing the average Colombian
with security against crime, kidnapping or assassination. 28 ° For
as long as corruption reigns supreme in Colombia, nothing the
United States does will truly make a difference.
What is the answer? Unfortunately, I have no sure solution
to offer. I do know, however, that Colombia needs to change its
229. Residents in areas where aerial spraying has been undertaken complain of
indiscriminate spraying of buildings, schools, and people. Reporting on 70 children
who were sprayed lastJune in rural southwestern Colombia while at school, the school's
principal said, "We had no way to give them first aid, so I sent them home. But they
had to cross fields and streams that had also been contaminated, so some of them got
sick." Furthermore, it is noted that the aerial spraying "also damaged legitimate crops,
undermining government efforts to support residents who have abandoned poppy
growing." Larry Rohter, To Colombians, Drug War Is Toxic Enemy, N.Y. TimsS, May 1,
2000, at Al.
230. A Muddle in theJungt ECONOMIST Mar. 4, 2000, at 17.
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soul. Perhaps the rise of a strong, benevolent dictator is a solu-
don to the problem-someone that can place before the Colom-
bian people a moral compass by which to steer a new course.
Perhaps the horrific prospect of allowing Colombia to settle its
fifty-year-old civil war on the battlefield is the solution. Perhaps
the long hoped for multinational forces under OAS direction
could successfully intervene in Colombia's affairs. If ever a situa-
tion existed in which such a force could make a positive impact
on a regional crisis, then Colombia is it. Without such a multina-
tional effort, neighboring countries are powerless to prevent the
Colombian crisis from spilling across its borders and reeking
havoc elsewhere.
I am not against mutual assistance and aid packages from
the United States. I am, however, opposed to the constant
"nickel and diming" of U.S. foreign policy, to the lack of clarity
and vision for the U.S. goals in the region, and to the executive
branch's continual dancing around the issues for the sake of
political expediency. If the Colombia crisis is the national secur-
ity threat we recognize it to be, then a concerted, 100% commit-
ment is required to bring about change, even if that means radi-
cally redefining Colombia's political infrastructure. But no
changes can succeed as long as Colombia remains a sick and
morally corrupt society.
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